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With words,
priests and poets make into many
the hidden Reality which is but One.
— RigVeda, X, 114, 2 [1]

ABSTRACT
In the history of human communication, the concept and need for secrecy
between the parties has always been present. One way of achieving it is
to modify the message so that it is readable only by the receiver, as in
cryptography for example. Hiding the message in an innocuous medium is
another, called steganography. And the counterpart to steganography, that
is, discovering whether a message is hidden in a specific medium, is called
steganalysis. Other concerns also fall within the broad scope of the term
steganalysis, such as estimating the message length for example (which is
quantitative steganalysis).
In this dissertation, the emphasis is put on classical steganalysis of images
first — the mere detection of a modified image — for which a practical
benchmark is proposed: the evaluation of a sufficient amount of samples
to perform the steganalysis in a statistically significant manner, followed
by feature selection for dimensionality reduction and interpretability. The
fact that most of the features used in the classical steganalysis task have
a physical meaning, regarding the image, lends itself to an introspection
and analysis of the selected features for understanding the functioning and
weaknesses of steganographic schemes.
This approach is computationally demanding, both because of the feature
selection and the size of the data in steganalysis problems. To address
this issue, a fast and efficient machine learning model is proposed, the
Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine (OP-ELM). It uses random
projections in the framework of an Artificial Neural Network (precisely, a
Single Layer Feedforward Network) along with a neuron selection strategy,
to obtain robustness regarding irrelevant features, and achieves state of the
art performances.
The OP-ELM is also used in a novel approach at quantitative steganalysis
(message length estimation). The re-embedding concept is proposed, which
embeds a new known message in a suspicious image. By repeating this
operation multiple times for varying sizes of the newly embedded message,
it is possible to estimate the original message size used by the sender, along
with a confidence interval on this value. An intrinsic property of the image,
the inner difficulty, is also revealed thanks to the confidence interval width;
this gives an important information about the reliability of the estimation on
the original message size.
keywords: Machine Learning, Steganography, Steganalysis, Extreme Learn-
ing Machine, Artificial Neural Networks, Feature Selection, Re-embedding.
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RÉSUMÉ
Depuis que les Hommes communiquent, le besoin de dissimuler tout ou
partie de la communication existe. On peut citer au moins deux formes de
dissimulation d’un message au sein d’une communication: Dans le premier
cas, le message à envoyer peut lui même être modifié, de telle sorte que seul
le destinataire puisse le décoder. La cryptographie s’emploie par exemple
à cette tâche. Une autre forme est celle de la stéganographie, qui vise à
dissimuler le message au sein d’un document. Et de même que pour la
cryptographie dont le pendant est la cryptanalyse visant à décrypter le
message, la stéganalyse est à l’opposé de la stéganographie et se charge de
détecter l’existence d’un message. Le terme de stéganalyse peut également
désigner l’importante classe de problèmes liés à la détection de l’existence
du message mais aussi à l’estimation de sa taille (stéganalyse quantitative)
ou encore de son contenu.
Dans cette thèse, l’accent est tout d’abord mis sur le problème classique
de stéganalyse (détection de la présence du message). Une méthodologie
permettant d’obtenir des résultats statistiquement fiables dans ce contexte
est proposée. Il sagit tout d’abord d’estimer le nombre d’échantillons (ici
des images) suffisant à l’obtention de résultats pertinents, puis de réduire
la dimensionalité du problème par une approche basée sur la sélection de
variables. Dans le contexte de la stéganalyse, la plupart des variables obtenues
peuvent être interprétées physiquement, ce qui permet une interprétation
de la sélection de variables obtenue: les variables sélectionnées en premier
réagissent vraisemblablement de façon importante aux changements causés
par la présence du message. Leur analyse peut permettre de comprendre le
fonctionnement et les faiblesses de l’algorithme de stéganographie utilisé,
par exemple.
Cette méthodologie peut s’avérer complexe en termes de calculs et donc
nécessiter des temps d’éxecution importants. Pour pallier à ce problème, un
nouveau modèle pour le “Machine Learning” est proposé, l’OP-ELM. L’OP-
ELM est constitué d’un Réseau de Neurones au sein duquel des projections
aléatoires sont utilisées. Les neurones sont ensuite classés par pertinence vis
à vis du problème, et seuls les plus pertinents sont conservés. Cette structure
de modèle parvient à obtenir des performances similaires à celles de l’état
de l’art dans le domaine du “Machine Learning”.
Enfin, le modèle OP-ELM est utilisé dans le cadre de la stéganalyse quanti-
tative, cette fois (l’estimation de la taille du message). Une approche nouvelle
sur ce problème est utilisée, faisant appel à une technique de ré-insertion
d’un message au sein d’une image considérée comme suspecte. En répétant
ce processus de ré-insertion un certain nombre de fois, et pour des messages
connus de tailles différentes, il est possible d’estimer la taille du message
original utilisé par l’expéditeur. De plus, par l’utilisation de la largeur de
l’intervalle de confiance obtenu sur la taille du message original, une mesure
de la difficulté intrinsèque à l’image est présentée. Ceci permet d’estimer la
fiabilité de la prédiction obtenue pour la taille du message original.
viii
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Chaque génération éprouve le désir
toujours renouvelé de se former
en s’opposant à l’air du temps,
à l’esprit du lieu,
et le désir de s’épanouir à l’ombre —
ou plutôt à la clarté —
d’un maître exemplaire.
— Daniel Pennac, Chagrin d’Ecole.
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1INTRODUCTION
1.1 scope of the dissertation
A typical problem in Machine Learning relates to the growing amount of
data and the ways of handling it. In this dissertation, we explore this problem
from a particular point of view: the steganalysis problem.
In the same way that cryptanalysis is the counterpart of cryptography,
steganalysis attempts to uncover steganography. The primary goals are rather
different from the cryptography ones, though. The art of steganography
relates to information hiding: a pair of communicating parties, sender and
receiver, attempt to pass a message hidden in an innocuous medium. A usual
setup is to have a potential eavesdropper who has access to the transmission
channel on which the medium between sender and receiver is exchanged —
for example, access to the picture sharing website that sender and receiver
use to exchange pictures (Flickr, Picasa. . . ). This eavesdropper is supposed
to be passive, in this dissertation, and only wishes to identify whether the
concerned medium has been tampered with or if it is genuine.
Steganalysis is then the work perpetrated by this eavesdropper, typically.
In the classical sense of steganalysis, the eavesdropper only identifies the
medium as tampered — for example to report it to authorities — but other
classes of steganalysis can go beyond a simple detection task: one may also
wish to gather information about the hidden message, such as its length,
how it has been hidden (i.e. by which steganography process). . .
In the unlikely event that the sender is being careless about the way of
hiding the message, the eavesdropper might even realize that the medium
has been modified by simply looking at it with his own eyes. With the coming
of digital age and more elaborate steganographic techniques, the task has
become much more challenging, though.
One way of performing steganalysis — and nowadays the most widely
used — is to extract some specific characteristics from the suspicious image,
known as features, and compare them to the ones obtained on other original
images. We can see here a supervised binary classification problem arise:
to compare the features of a suspicious image and of genuine images, it is
possible to use a machine learning model previously trained to recognize the
differences between genuine and tampered.
Due to the large number of features typically used in steganalysis (in the
order of magnitude of hundreds), the machine learning task is not straight-
forward and requires specific models able to deal with such dimensionality
of the data.
In this dissertation, we propose a new machine learning model, the OP-
ELM, based on random projections and neuron selection, to obtain a suffi-
ciently good performance/ speed ratio; it is then possible to conduct more
numerous and elaborate experiments related to steganalysis problems. We
then develop a methodology for steganalysis, to obtain a practical benchmark
for a steganographic algorithm in a reliable manner. Finally, we address the
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problem of the estimation of the message length and its reliability in a novel
manner, by the use of an approach using re-embeddings.
1.2 scientific contributions of the dissertation
The present dissertation contains the following scientific contributions:
• A new machine learning model based on random projections and
Artificial Neural Networks is proposed, the Optimally-Pruned Extreme
Learning Machine. It is based on an existing scheme, the Extreme
Learning Machine, by Huang [69] and addresses one of its original
weaknesses: its sensitivity to irrelevant features in a data set. Using
a large number of neurons in the neural network built by the ELM,
ranking them using the MRSR algorithm [117] and selecting only the
most relevant ones by a Leave-One-Out criterion, the OP-ELM reduces
greatly the sensitivity of the original ELM, while retaining very low
computational times.
• The original version of the OP-ELM is modified in the place of the
neuron selection criterion. Instead of using the Leave-One-Out criterion,
we propose to use an information theoretic based one, the Hannan-
Quinn criterion [62]. This modification is also proposed for another
model using a structure similar to that of the OP-ELM, the OP-KNN
[136], and enables to increase the speed of the original OP-ELM by
three to four folds while retaining similar performances.
• Using the OP-ELM as a machine learning tool, a methodology for
reliable steganalysis is proposed, which aims at estimating a sufficient
number of images required for the results to be statistically significant.
This methodology illustrates that for all cases of steganographic algo-
rithms, an insufficient number of images to perform steganalysis gives
results with a large variance. Regarding the number of features this
time, the second part of the methodology for reliable steganalysis uses
feature selection to reduce the computational time and complexity of
the problem, while keeping the same performances. These selected
features can then be analyzed to reverse-engineer the steganographic
algorithm used.
• The problem of quantitative steganalysis is tackled by a novel approach
using the re-embedding concept. By embedding new messages in
multiple copies of the suspicious image, we propose to estimate the
original embedding rate with a confidence interval on the value. In
addition, the width of the obtained confidence interval is shown to be
an estimator of the inner image difficulty.
1.3 publications presented and author’s contribution
This dissertation consists in an introductory part, and the six following
peer-reviewed publications.
A — OP-ELM: Optimally-Pruned Extreme LearningMachine, Yoan Miche, Antti
Sorjamaa, Patrick Bas, Olli Simula, Christian Jutten and Amaury
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Lendasse. In IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, January 2010,
Number 1, pp. 158–162 , Volume 21.
In this publication, the Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine
(OP-ELM) is proposed. It is a methodology built around the original
Extreme Learning Machine [69] with the aim of having a fast, efficient
and more robust model (regarding the sensitivity of the original ELM
to irrelevant data). The OP-ELM adds new kernels to the original ELM
and uses a pruning of the neurons with the MRSR [117] algorithm
and a Leave-One-Out criterion to remove the most irrelevant ones. In
this work, the original idea was proposed by Amaury Lendasse and
developed by the author and Amaury Lendasse. The experiments and
writing of the publication have been carried out mainly by the author,
with the help of Antti Sorjamaa. The other authors have provided
useful suggestions and corrections to the original manuscript.
B — A Faster Model Selection Criterion for OP-ELM and OP-KNN: Hannan-
Quinn Criterion, Yoan Miche and Amaury Lendasse. In ESANN’09: Eu-
ropean Symposium on Artificial Neural Networks, April 2009, Michel
Verleysen ed., published by d-side publications. pp. 177–182.
In this conference publication, we sought to replace the originally used
Leave-One-Out criterion of the original OP-ELM by a faster one, and
decided to use an information criterion for this task. Writing of the
article and experiments using the OP-ELM and OP-KNN with the new
criterion were carried out by the author.
C — A Feature Selection Methodology for Steganalysis, Yoan Miche, Benoit
Roue, Patrick Bas and Amaury Lendasse. In MRCS’06, International
Workshop on Multimedia Content Representation, Classification and
Security, Istanbul (Turkey), B. Gunsel, A. K. Jain, A. M. Tekalp and
B. Sankur eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag,
2006. Volume 4105, pp. 49–56.
This publication is the very first one dealing with feature selection
for steganalysis and is the first publication of the author as a doctoral
student. The idea is an improvement from the Master’s thesis work
carried out in the months before the beginning of the doctoral stud-
ies. The idea is to prove that by using a reduced set of features in
steganalysis, one can obtain the same performances while reducing
the computational time and gaining interpretability (from the selected
features). The author conducted most of the experiments, helped by
Benoit Roue, Patrick Bas and Amaury Lendasse. The conference paper
was written by the author.
D — Advantages of Using Feature Selection Techniques on Steganalysis Schemes,
Yoan Miche, Patrick Bas, Amaury Lendasse, Christian Jutten and Olli
Simula. In IWANN’07: International Work-Conference on Artificial
Neural Networks, San Sebastian, Spain, June 2007, Francisco Sandoval
et al. eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin /
Heidelberg. Volume 4507/2007, pp. 606–613.
While performing more experiments using the methodology from the
previous publication, the author realized that the statistical stability
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of the results was affected by the number of samples used to perform
the experiments. In this spirit, another methodology was devised, to
infer a sufficient number of samples for the steganalysis task using
a specific set of features. The idea and experiments were carried out
by the author, as well as the writing. The advisors Patrick Bas and
Amaury Lendasse provided very useful advice and helped correcting
the original manuscript.
E — Reliable Steganalysis Using a Minimum Set of Samples and Features, Yoan
Miche, Patrick Bas, Amaury Lendasse, Christian Jutten and Olli Simula.
In EURASIP Journal on Information Security, March 2009. Hindawi
Publishing Corporation. Volume 2009, Article ID 901381, pp. 1–13.
This publication is the result of the combination of the two previous
ones, used on six different steganographic algorithms, for different
embedding rates and on a large publicly available database of images.
In addition, this version of the global methodology uses the OP-ELM
consistently everywhere, while the previous publications were using
k-Nearest Neighbors and Support Vector Machines at different stages,
for speed or performance. The author carried out the experiments and
wrote the article. Patrick Bas helped greatly with the interpretability of
the selected features and Amaury Lendasse on the Machine Learning
problems that arose. All authors have finally helped improving the
quality of the manuscript by providing essential remarks.
F — Using Multiple Re-embeddings for Quantitative Steganalysis and Image Re-
liability Estimation, Yoan Miche, Patrick Bas and Amaury Lendasse. In
TKK Reports in Information and Computer Science, June 2010, Espoo.
Number TKK-ICS-R34. ISBN 978-952-60-3249-8 (Print).
The last publication is related to very recent work on quantitative ste-
ganalysis. The use of a novel approach using re-embedding enables to
estimate more reliably the original message’s length and also provides
insights on the inner image difficulty. The use of re-embedding was
devised during a fruitful discussion between the author, Tomàš Pevny`
and Patrick Bas. The author carried out the experiments and the paper
writing, with the help of Amaury Lendasse and Patrick Bas, especially
on the concept of inner image difficulty.
In the rest of the dissertation, the included publications are referred by
the capital letter used above, i.e. “Publication A” for the publication entitled
“OP-ELM: Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine”, by Yoan Miche et al.,
January 2010.
1.4 structure of the dissertation
This dissertation is articulated in three main parts. The first one dwells
with the field of steganography and steganalysis and aims at giving a short
overview of the field in order to explicate the main results and contributions
of this thesis. The second chapter proposes a review of steganography and
its recent evolutions, toward digital media, and more specifically images.
Some of the most widely used steganography algorithms are presented
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and described, along with the main principles and important definitions.
This chapter lays the foundation and motivation for the following one, about
steganalysis. This third chapter describes the concept of steganalysis at length,
with the variants of the steganalysis problem (quantitative, forensic. . . ).
A detailed presentation of the classical sets of features used to perform
feature-based steganalysis is given to illustrate one of the problems faced in
steganalysis today: the growing dimensionality of the data.
The second part of this dissertation proposes first a review of the machine
learning field, in the fourth chapter, followed by the presentation of a novel
machine learning method capable of handling large data sets in reasonable
computational times. The fifth chapter details this novel model and the class
of models it is built on, the random projections used in Artificial Neural
Networks framework.
The third part lays two methodologies aimed at two different problems
in steganalysis. The first one, in chapter six is directed toward obtaining
reliable results in classical steganalysis setups, by the determination of a
sufficient number of images required to perform the task, and then a study
on the required features, to perform the task. The seventh chapter then deals
with the quantitative steganalysis problem and uses a novel approach to
obtain an estimate of the embedded message’s length and estimate an inner
characteristic of a considered image: its difficulty for a steganalysis task.
The dissertation is finally concluded in chapter eight.

Part I
BAS ICS ON STEGANOGRAPHY AND
STEGANALYS I S

2STEGANOGRAPHY
This chapter first defines globally the concept of steganography, with some
historical examples. Some definitions in the steganography framework are
then given such as the capacity and embedding rate, followed by details about
the two main parts of steganography: the model-based and coding-based ste-
ganography. Finally, a non-exhaustive review of famous and widely used
steganography algorithms and techniques is given.
2.1 what is steganography
While the idea of steganography dates back to ancient times (from the
available records we have on it), it is only recently that the actual name
has been devised, by Johannes Trithemius (1462–1516), in Steganographia.
Steganographia is believed to be one of the very first works on cryptography
and steganography, in which various primitive cryptography and stegano-
graphy techniques are detailed. The steganography term itself was created
from the Greek “steganos” — covered — and “graphia” — writing. The third book of
Steganographia was
believed to be about
occultism and magic
until very recently
[124]. When it got
deciphered [109], it
revealed to be also
about steganography
and cryptography.
In steganography, only the existence of the message is secret: the commu-
nication channel is considered as open and the message itself is not usually
modified so as to resist an attacker by itself (although it can be encrypted,
e.g.). The main achievement is hence to hide the message as well as possible
in an innocuous content, so that any eavesdropper would have no suspicions.
Figure 1 illustrates a case of steganography (LSB replacement, see section
2.4.2) for which the hiding of the message is invisible to the human eye.
It is important to distinguish steganography from cryptography, first: crypto-
graphy aims at modifying the message so that it becomes impossible to read
to an eavesdropper. It is of no concern to cryptography that the encrypted
message might look suspicious. Steganography does not alter the message
but only hides it in a medium, so that it will not arise suspicions. Steganography is
different from
cryptography and
watermarking. . .
One also wants to make a difference between steganography and water-
marking. In the latter, one of the main concerns is to be robust, not hidden
(although it might be a secondary requirement). A watermark should resist
to various transformations of the original content so that it does not get
disrupted or destroyed. The simple example of a copyright mark placed in
an image, should be resistant to most image transformations such as resizing,
cropping, rotation or JPEG compression [78]. . . In a similar fashion, audio
watermarking attempts to resist various transformations of the audio signal,
for example MP3 compression [32].
Let us go through some historical examples of steganography. Trithemius
describes only text-based steganography (text is the medium for the stegano-
graphy) in his Steganographia, but in the history of human communications
there have been numerous examples of steganography, in many different
forms.
9
10 steganography
All work and no play makes Jack...
Alll work and no play makes Jac.....
All wrk and no play makes Jack......
Alll work and no play mkes Jack.....
Steganographic
Algorithm
Message m
Stego Image
Cover Image
Figure 1: A simple illustration of steganography for an image: a message m is em-
bedded in the cover image by the means of a steganographic algorithm. The
resulting image (containing the message m), looking as similar as possible
to the original cover image, is called stego image.
2.2 historically
Since communication exists, the need for secrecy in this communication has
been present, whether for benign privacy purposes or malicious ones. SomeHerodotus has many
steganography
examples: hiding a
message in a belt
buckle, earrings. . .
of the oldest known examples are related by Herodotus in his Histories [64]:
Histiaeus, willing to regain his position of tyrant of Miletus, sent a message
by means of steganography to his nephew Aristagoras, in order to instigate a
revolt in the Ionia. The message was conveyed by a slave of Histiaeus whose
head had been first shaved and tattooed with the content of the message.
Once the hair grew back sufficiently to cover the message, the slave could be
sent without any risk to Aristagoras, who only had to shave the head of the
slave to recover the message.
Another example from the same source involves the use of a wooden tablet
engraved with the message and then covered with wax. The recipients only
had to scrape the wax to obtain the message, while throughout the many
enemy hands the tablet passed, it only seemed like an innocuous wax tablet.
More recently, when reprints of internal British cabinet documents were
found repeatedly in the press, Margaret Thatcher allegedly had a small
message (different for each copy) embedded in the documents given to
each minister. The message was embedded in the spacing properties of theThe coded message
was also possibly
included in the word
processors of each
minister.
documents (word and line spacings) and enabled to identify a potential leak
in the government [7].
Unfortunately all these examples rely on “non-official” sources and there
are no concrete proofs of such steganography. Obviously, the best stegano-
graphy cases will possibly never come detected or known. . .
2.3 nowadays
In the last few years, the interest for steganography has been rising, as
shows for example the number of publications related to steganography and
watermarking subjects as reported by the IEEE [30].
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Both newspapers USA Today (USA) and Corriere della Sera (Italy) claimed
the use of steganographic means (using images as the medium) for Al Quaeda
communications. Unfortunately, no evidence or actual article proving the
allegations ever appeared. Steganography is
seldomly detected in
real life, but is most
likely used.
Nevertheless, research agencies and governments being apprehensive for
The possibility that it
is used and not being
detected worries
many securities
agencies. Especially
regarding terrorism
related
communications.
the use of steganography have had a growing interest in developing and
detecting it. The discovery of a section about steganography and covert
communication in the Technical Mujahid, a Training Manual for Jihadis, has
brought back these matters in the light of possible terrorism, which can
partly explain this interest.
In any case, the existence of steganography and the possibilities it opens
makes it an interesting security-related problem worth being investigated.
The growth in numbers of digital objects publicly available has made
digital steganography an easier task, in the sense that it has become difficult
for the authorities to monitor all of the digital content being exchanged.
Especially since this digital content can be of various nature. Indeed, one
can rather easily find steganographic algorithms for media such as text (the
British government example mentioned before being a simple but efficient
one), sounds and images.
2.3.1 Some steganography examples
The cases of images and sounds are particular, since they can be compressed
in a lossy way. This creates additional domains in which steganography can While not the most
popular form, audio
steganography
techniques exist.
be performed. For example, MP3 compression for sounds is lossy in that
it removes from the original recording the parts that are considered to be
beyond standard human auditory resolution. This loss in data makes data
hiding possible, for example by modifying slightly the MP3 compression
algorithm so that it embeds the message bits by changing pseudo-randomly
some parity bits in the compression process [95, 115]. Works on non-lossy
objects or algorithms also exist, for example on Wave files by Least-Significant
Bit modification [127].
In the following, and throughout the dissertation, the focus will be on
image steganography, and more precisely, on JPEG images, for which some
explanatory details are proposed in the next section 2.4. Image steganography We focus only on
image steganography
and algorithms for it.
seems to be the most popular kind of steganography, certainly because of
the large amount of available images, but also because the widely used JPEG
lossy compression algorithm gives many liberties for data hiding.
2.3.2 The two main parts of steganography
One can separate the
steganography ideas
into two categories:
Model-based and
Coding-based.
Before going into the details of some classical steganography techniques, it
is necessary to point out the two main parts of steganography (intertwined
for most of the algorithms): Model-based and Coding-based. In the following,
we will go through a few definitions of steganography concepts first, and
then present the Model and Coding based parts.
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Definitions
In the following, we will refer to the medium as the image, and the message
to hide in it as the message. A genuine image will be called “cover” or cover
image, while an image containing a message — we say that the message has
been embedded in the image — will be named stego image. Moreover, the term
stego will be used in place of steganographic, for example in the terminology
stego algorithm for a steganographic algorithm.
the stego capacity Let us now define a widely used quantity: the
stego capacity. While it can be empirically described as “the maximumThe stego capacity is
a simple concept: how
much can be
embedded while
satisfying low
distortion
constraints?
amount of data that can be hidden in the cover [image] while satisfying a set
of constraints on the distortion”, the stego capacity remains a quantity that
is difficult to estimate.
In [27], an investigation of the general capacity definition for a system with
side information at the embedder (which is the case of steganography) is
proposed in the more specific case of steganalysis. A result from [57] states
that the capacity C can be expressed as
C = max
P(U,Is|Ic)
(MI (U, Is)−MI (U, Ic)) , (2.1)
Capacity can be
expressed using
Mutual Information
and Entropy.
where MI (·, ·) denotes the mutual information, U an auxiliary random
variable and Ic and Is the random variables corresponding to the cover
image (respectively stego). Using then the fact that
MI (U, Is)−MI (U, Ic) = H (Is)−H (Is|U)−MI (Ic,U) , (2.2)
where H(·) refers to the entropy, it appears that
MI (U, Is)−MI (U, Ic) ￿ H (Ic) , (2.3)
under the perfect steganography constraint, that is, in terms of entropy
H (Ic) = H (Is) . (2.4)
Hence, under the assumption of a perfect stego algorithm, the upper bound
on the capacity C is the entropy of the cover image.
For the matter of an imperfect stego algorithm (ε-secure with ε > 0 for
example, see section 3.1 for the definition of the ε-security), Filler et al. in [42]
propose the Theorem of the Square Root Law of steganography for Markov
covers.
Under the assumptions that the cover images can be modeled by a first
order (stationary) Markov Chain, and that the embedding process can be
modeled as an independent substitution of one state to another (the LSB
embedding, nsF5, JSteg and MMx stego algorithms presented in 2.4.2 respect
this hypothesis), the capacity for an imperfect stego algorithm follows three
main propositions (the results are valid in the limit case n→∞ , with n the
number of elements to embed in, and the reader is referred to the original
publication [42] for more thorough presentation of the problem and results):Under some
assumptions, the
stego capacity follows
a square root law
[42].
1. Using a capacity smaller than
√
n — the square root of the number of
elements that can be modified to embed the message — the embedding
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can be arbitrarily secure (in terms of ε-security, it can be up to ε-secure
with ε > 0), given enough elements n to embed the message in;
2. Using a capacity larger than
√
n leads to a non-secure situation where
the steganographer risks detection;
3. Using a capacity of the order of
√
n leads to a possibly secure embedding
(again, in terms of ε-security, this means that the embedding is ε-secure
with a fixed ε — no more arbitrarily small).
Hence, if the communication is to remain secure between the two parties, one
wants to be in the first proposition case and be careful about the embedding
rate that is used, vis a vis the secure capacity (in the sense of proposition 1).
the embedding rate This second definition concerns the widely used
quantity embedding rate. It is meant to measure a ratio between the amount Two possible
definitions for the
embedding rate.
of data embedded and the specifics of the cover image. Hence, it is highly
dependent on the image considered: for a given stego algorithm, some
images can contain more information than others, while remaining just as
undetectable.
There are many definitions for it, although one seems to prevail nowadays:
the embedding rate R(1) is defined as the ratio between the number of embed-
ding changes E and the number of non-zero AC coefficients (of the cover image)
A:
R(1) =
E
A
. (2.5)
Related to the
embedding changes
and non-zero AC
coefficients. . .
The concept of AC coefficients is inherent to the JPEG format (see section
2.4) and hence, this measure is mostly used for JPEG steganography matters.
Another possible definition of the embedding rate (used in one of the
publications related to this dissertation) is using the embedding capacity of
the algorithm. It is therefore also related to the stego algorithm directly. The
embedding rate R(2) using the capacity is defined as the ratio between the
size S(m) of the embedded message m (usually measured in bits) and the
total embedding capacity CTot (also measured in bits), defined previously:
R(2) =
S(m)
CTot
. (2.6)
. . . or to the message
size and capacity.Again, the first definition R(1) is mainly used nowadays. The second
definition R(2) can be most useful when the stego algorithm does not provide
information on the number of embedding changes, though.
In the specific case of LSB embedding [49] (or for steganography on raw
images, generally), the embedding rate can also be defined in bits per pixel
(bpp), which consists in dividing the total amount of bits embedded by the
number of pixels of the image.
Finally, it is worth noting that in the following, we will consider natural
images only, meaning that synthetic images (entirely produced by a 3D
rendering software or drawings, e.g.) are not part of this analysis. Natural
images are for example outdoor scenes snapshots taken by a camera.
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Follows the description of the two main parts of a stego scheme: Model-
based and Coding-based steganography.
Model-based Steganography
Model-based aims at
modeling the
distribution of media
to find where to
embed to minimize
the distortion.
Model-based steganography as introduced by Sallee [111] makes use of (part
of) the knowledge of the medium’s instances distribution in order to hide a
message. If we consider that there exists a random variable I with probability
distribution PI modeling the images, and that we take a single realization
i of I (i is an image), we can separate i in two parts, iα and iβ (which are
instances of the random variables Iα and Iβ). The iα part will remain intact
while the iβ will be modified or totally replaced by the actual message im.
See Figure 4 for an illustration of the idea of Model-based steganography for
the stego algorithm MBSteg (section 2.4.2).
The inherent idea is that given the knowledge of PI (or a sufficiently good
approximation of it PˆI), it is possible to find iβ such that the composite
(iα, im) is correctly distributed vis a vis PI (or its approximation PˆI). Mean-
ing that we can estimate the distribution for multiple possible Iβ conditioned
on the current Iα: PˆIα|Iβ(Iβ|Iα = iα). If a im that respects this distribution
is found, the composite image (iα, im) respects all the properties of a cover
image and cannot be distinguished in any sense from the other cover im-
ages (again, provided that our model approximation PˆI is good enough to
approximate cover images).
One obvious problem of this approach is to model PI. While it is clear that
modeling the ensemble of natural images is impossible, it remains possible
to have a simplified model of PI and cut i into iα and iβ such that modifying
iβ will satisfy a set of constraints (for example not being visible to the human
eye).
This part of steganography really aims at having sufficient information (or
a sufficiently good model) of the whole space of media (cover images here)
such that the way of tempering with a cover image will make sure that it still
follows the distribution of cover images.
Coding-based Steganography
The goal of the coding-based part of steganography is different, although
as said before, both approaches are used at the same time in most usable
stego algorithms. Here, the emphasis is on the way to code the information —Coding-based tries to
insert the message
using a special
encoding so as to
minimize the
distortion.
the message to embed — such that the tempering of the cover image will be
minimal. A famous example of coding-based scheme is theMatrix Embedding
(or Syndrome Coding) approach proposed by Crandall in [31].
We give a simple example of this idea for the insertion of k = 2 bits of
message, denoted as m1 and m2. Assume there are n = 3 bits available for
insertion in the cover image (these bits have been devised previously, for
example using Model-based steganography), denoted as s1, s2, s3. If one
wants to insert the k = 2 bits of information by changing only one bit among
s1, s2, s3, we have four possible cases to consider:
• m1 = s1 ⊕ s3,m2 = s2 ⊕ s3 =⇒ no changes
• m1 ￿= s1 ⊕ s3,m2 = s2 ⊕ s3 =⇒ change : s1
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• m1 = s1 ⊕ s3,m2 ￿= s2 ⊕ s3 =⇒ change : s2
• m1 ￿= s1 ⊕ s3,m2 ￿= s2 ⊕ s3 =⇒ change : s3
Therefore, when inserting two message bits in the host data, only one bit
will be modified. In the general case, matrix encoding enables to find a set of
n bits in the host data where k message bits can be embedded with less than
dmax actual modifications; this found solution is usually denoted by the
triplet (dmax,n, k). The F5 stego algorithm detailed in section 2.4.2 makes
use of the matrix embedding approach.
Another famous coding-based technique is the named Wet Paper codes
[52, 54], proposed by Fridrich et al. The concept is based on the exact solving Wet paper codes give
good secrecy and
allow to define areas
of the image where
not to embed the
message.
of the linear system
Db = m (2.7)
where D is a binary matrix shared by both sender and receiver, b represents
the modified cover image bits (to be determined) andm contains the message
bits. The difficulty of the problem lies in solving such a system exactly (or the
message bits from m would be altered). Provided that the system 2.7 has a
solution, though, this scheme is very secure since the binary matrix D (which
can be brought back to a single stego-key K initializing a pseudo-random
generator) is supposed to be known by sender and receiver only. More details
about the specifics of this scheme can be found in the original publication
[52] (this short presentation is overly simplified).
In this context of coding-based steganography, a widely used measure
of the efficiency of the scheme used (such as matrix embedding) is the
embedding efficiency, first defined in [132]. This quantity is measured by the
expected number of message bits (supposed to be random, i.e. not having
any dependence with the modified quantities in the cover image) embedded
per embedding change. The reader is refered to [55] for a thorough review
of the embedding efficiency for various types of matrix embedding schemes.
The concept of security for a steganographic scheme will be discussed in
the next chapter 3, once steganalysis has been introduced.
2.3.3 A future development: Batch Steganography
A possibly more
realistic setup for
steganography: many
images to embed the
message in.
In [76], Ker proposed to consider a point which is often left aside, in stega-
nography: the steganographer (sender) will most likely have access to more
than just one cover image, and he will try to use this as an advantage. Ker
poses the question and lays the foundation for what is called batch stega-
nography, that is, finding the best possible way of embedding a predefined
message in a set of cover images (possibly in a subset of them, actually).
Given a set of assumptions
• the number N of cover images is fixed beforehand;
• all cover objects have the same capacity;
• the sender chooses randomly the cover images in which to embed,
it is shown that the steganography is the most secure when the message m
is divided in a small number of portions (and hence, embedded in a small
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number of images), which is a rather non-intuitive idea. One would a prioriTheoretical results on
batch stegano are
counter-intuitive. . .
think that the “safest” solution is to divide m into as many small parts as
possible, and make a very small number of embedding changes to many
images in the set.
This part of the steganography field is rather recent and has still not been
widely investigated. Most algorithms and techniques considered to be state
of the art are still working on single-image cases.
The following section proposes a non-exhaustive overview of the most
used steganography algorithms. They are all publicly available.
2.4 current state of the art techniques
In order to present some of the most used stego algorithms, we first introduce
some notations and definitions, especially about the JPEG image compression
algorithm.
2.4.1 JPEG basics
The 6 main steps of
the JPEG
compression.
The acronym JPEG stands for Joint Photographic Experts Group, a committee
which created the JPEG compression algorithm [28]. By extension, the JPEG
name is used for images using this compression method, but the original
name refers to the compression part only.
The JPEG algorithm is mostly known for its efficiency when used in a lossy
way, but depending on the compression rate, one can also use it for non-lossy
means (its performance in terms of compression is then outperformed by
other algorithms).
There are 6 main steps in the JPEG algorithm:
Divide the image into
blocks; 1. Block splitting: The original (raw) image is divided into square blocks,
typically of 64 pixels (8× 8, but it can be different). The following steps
are then applied to each block separately.
change the
color-space; 2. Changing color-space: The RGB original color-space is changed to a
YCbCr. The RGB color-space is coding for the three basis colors it uses:
Red, Green and Blue. The YCbCr color-space uses a luminance compo-
nent (Y) and only two chroma components (Cb for blue-difference and
Cr for red-difference).
sub-sample the colors;
3. Sub-sampling of chromas: The gain from the JPEG compression comes
in part from this step. Since the human eye is more sensitive to lumi-
nance than to chromas, the Y component is left untouched while the
sub-sampling is performed on the chromas.
DCT-transform the
coefficients; 4. Discrete Cosine Transform: Each component (Y, Cb and Cr) of each
block goes through a discrete cosine transform. For an 8× 8 block
denoted as {i(x,y)}1￿x,y￿8, the DCT coefficients {I(u, v)}1￿u,v￿8 are
computed as
I(u, v) =
1
4
C(u)C(v)
 7￿
x=0
7￿
y=0
i(x,y) cos
(2x+ 1)uπ
16
cos
(2y+ 1)vπ
16
 ,
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(2.8)
with C(u) = C(v) = 1/
√
2 if u = v = 0 and C(u) = C(v) = 1 otherwise.
The main idea behind this transformation is to get a large number of
zero coefficients for the final coding.
quantize the
coefficients;5. Quantization: Using fixed quantization matrices (different for each
channel), the low frequencies are preserved, while the high frequencies
are getting close to zero (or are zeros). The rationale is again that the
human eye is more sensitive to low frequencies than high ones.
order and compress.
6. Zig-Zag ordering and final lossless compression: These steps only aim
at having an optimal way of compressing the remaining data (most of
the coefficients of each block are zero) so that the final size is minimal.
Note that in the rest of this dissertation, we will mostly ignore the last step
of this procedure, and consider that the JPEG image is a large array of DCT
coefficients placed at the exact same place than the part of the image they
are representing.
As discussed before, the lossy aspect of this algorithm makes it interesting
for hiding data. Indeed, since most of the DCT coefficients are zeros or very
small values, it seems likely that modifying the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of
some coefficients will be visually (to the human eye, that is) undetectable. By Modifying the LSB of
DCT coeffs is a
simple stego scheme
eventually detectable
visually.
modifying such bits (chosen pseudo-randomly thanks to a shared stego-key,
e.g.), one can embed a message and avoid visual detection. This is the basis
for LSB steganography. For large enough payloads, though, this becomes
very easily detectable by statistical means [49, 133].
Recent stego algorithms try to address not only the visual aspect of the
distortion created by the embedding, but also many statistical aspects of
the image (histograms of AC coefficients for example, that is, the low-value
coefficients of the DCT-transformed matrix of values).
2.4.2 A non-exhaustive overview of Stego algorithms
The proposed overview of stego algorithms contains most of the considered
state-of-the-art methods. It is by no means exhaustive and only aims at
presenting the concepts of these algorithms so that future discussions on
their behavior are made easier.
LSB replacement/ matching
As the name implies, the early schemes of LSB replacement [114] are em-
bedding the information by replacing the LSB of an image’s bytes directly
(first separating the RGB components of the image), either in a completely
sequential way, or by choosing the bytes to modify pseudo-randomly, thanks
to a stego-key, for example. LSB matching takes
advantage of the LSB
value.
The LSB matching (also called ±1 embedding) is working in the same
way, except that it compares the bit of the message to embed in a LSB and
modifies it — by a random ±1 modification on the LSB, except if it leads to
a zero value — only if necessary (i.e. the message bit to embed and the LSB
do not match).
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Figure 2: Schematic concept of the Outguess algorithm.
Outguess
Outguess tries to
avoid statistical
attacks by “canceling”
the changes caused by
the embedding.
Niels Provos in [106] proposes the Outguess algorithm, supposed to resist
especially well to statistical attacks. The process has two main parts, detailed
in the following and summarized on Figure 2.
• Identify the LSBs: these are chosen only among the LSB of DCT coeffi-
cients which are different from 0 and 1. This choice is made because
most of the coefficients have 0 and 1 values and modifying them would
result in a too visible change in the global histogram and be easily
detectable. As some image parts may contain more information than
the others, the LSBs are marked with their potential detectability. This
enables the algorithm not to use these for message embedding (if
possible).
• Select the LSBs to use. About half of them will be used to actually
embed the message information, while the remaining half will be used
to correct the statistical deviations created by the embedding.
First a stream cipher is initialized with a user key. A pseudo-random
number generator initialization (first seed) is derived from this cipher. TheOutguess embeds in
half the identified
LSBs and corrects the
distortions using the
other half.
algorithm hides another pseudo-random generator initialization state which
will enable to recover the location of the modified LSBs, and the size of the
embedded message.
After the seed and length of the message are embedded, the algorithm
hides the message itself. In this embedding process, the algorithm tries to
dispatch the message bits as much as possible in the image, by adapting the
random values to the size of the message and of the available size in the
embedding image.
During this process, a value of total detectability is incremented with
the value of detectability of each used LSB, determined by a heuristic. The
algorithm uses many try-outs and keeps the lowest possible total detectability
value.
A correcting transform is then applied on the remaining LSBs (the other
part of the redundant) to try to preserve as much as possible the statistics.
Retrieving of the message requires only the user key, to initialize the
pseudo-random number generator and then obtain the second seed and
length of the message from the image.
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Figure 3: An overview of the vertices creation process for the Steghide algorithm.
Sizes of chunk and modulo values are parameters of the algorithm and are
respectively chosen as 3 and 4 in this example (arbitrary).
Steghide
Steghide uses sample
flipping governed by
an informed graph.
In [65], Stefan Hetzl and Petra Mutzel describe a graph-based algorithm for
steganography which implementation is called Steghide. The embedding
process is in fact mostly a sample flipping process, governed by a graph
created while evaluating the samples of the host data and comparing them
to the message to embed.
The host data is first abstracted as a set of samples (pixels for the case of
images). Sets of samples will then be “evaluated” and compared to the data to
embed. From the need to modify a sample of the host data in order to embed
the message, a vertex is created. A similarity measure then enables to find
potential samples in the host data to be exchanged with the one considered
for embedding, and an edge is then created between these samples. An example of the
graph building in
Steghide on Fig. 3.
As shown on Figure 3, host data (cover image) is divided into chunks
of samples (ij with three samples per chunk, in this example) for which a
Comparison Value is calculated through addition modulo 4 in this case (these
values of three samples per chunk and addition modulo 4 are algorithm
parameters that are optimized for the considered embedding). The obtained
values are compared with the message values. If different, a vertex is created
for this pair host data chunk/message chunk. Parameters of the vertex are
obtained from simple calculations on the chunk values.
Then, edges are created between the vertices, based on the similarity of
the considered two vertices, for the actual embedding of the message is done
through flipping of vertices, as mentioned above.
F5
F5 takes a
permutation method
and the matrix
encoding scheme.
F5 has been proposed by Andreas Westfeld in [132] and claims to have an
increased robustness compared to its predecessors, F3 and F4, as well as a
much higher embedding rate.
It is based on two main ideas:
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• A permutation method, allowing to scatter the embedded bits through
all of the image instead of having the changes only in the beginning;
• Matrix encoding, imagined by Ron Crandall [31], enables to increase
the embedding rate while minimizing the number of changes.
The F5 algorithm is largely based on matrix encoding; it uses dmax = 1 and
is looking for the best k in order to insert the whole message. A main point
about F5 is that it never directly modifies the LSB of DCT coefficients, but
only decreases their values (except the ones that are already zero), thanks
to the matrix encoding part. The so-called shrinkage effect happening in F5
is due to LSB decrease creating a zero value. Since the algorithm does not
read (and does not use) the zero DCT coefficients, the information has to be
embedded again in another LSB. This effect creates detectable changes in the
histograms of the DCT coefficients.
-F5, nsF5,. . .
-F5 and nsF5 try to
eliminate the
shrinkage effect
happening with F5.
The -F5 and nsF5 (for no-shrinkage F5) are derivations of the original F5
algorithm, which address some of its drawbacks. The shrinkage effect happens
in F5 when the modification of the LSB by F5 leads to a zero. In [56], Fridrich
et al. propose to alleviate this effect by increasing the value of the LSB, instead
of decreasing it. This is called the -F5 algorithm.
The nsF5 algorithm makes use of the wet paper codes previously discussed.
By doing so, it avoids putting LSBs of AC coefficients to zero without coding
any information (the decoding part does not look for information in the
zero LSBs), and hence, avoids the shrinkage effect. To describe this using the
notations from 2.3.2, assume that the message m to embed is k bits long, and
that there are n LSBs of AC coefficients (which have value either 0 or 1), out
of which nu are usable for modification (i.e. non-zero). The problem is then
to find the vector of modified LSBs b such that the system
Db = m, (2.9)
is satisfied, with D still being a pseudo-random binary matrix shared
by both sender and receiver (via a secret key initializing a pseudo-random
generator, for example).
MBSteg
MBSteg tries to
model statistics of the
image and keep them
intact.
Sallee in [111] proposed the Model Based steganography, already presented
in section 2.3.2. It tries to “adapt” the message to a part of the cover image, by
entropy decoding. Figure 4 inspired from the original publication, illustrates
the process for JPEG images.
The original cover image AC DCT coefficients are separated into iα and iβ.
iα will be kept intact and serves to model the histograms of the individual
AC DCT modes. The model PˆIα|Iβ is fed to an entropy decoder along with
the encrypted/compressed message (so that it is close enough to random
data). The result of this step is im which respects the cover image structure
(thanks to the model) while embedding the message.
The interesting direct consequence from this scheme is that the histograms
of individual AC DCT modes should be well preserved, along with the
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Figure 4: The MBSteg Algorithm.
global histogram, due to the “adaptation” through entropy decoding, of the
message to embed.
MMx
MMx is a variation of
the matrix encoding.MMx — standing for Modified Matrix Encoding — is a variation of the
matrix encoding algorithm (implemented in F5 by Westfeld [132]) proposed
by Kim et al. in [79].
While F5 makes use of the triplet (d,n, k) with a fixed d = 1 for the
matrix encoding, MMx uses a (d ￿,n, k) triplet, with d ￿ usually 2 or 3: this
change makes it possible to have more than one bit change per block since
d ￿ modifications of the set of n bits (meant for embedding k message bits)
are allowed for the matrix encoding.
JPHS
JPHS concept is not
disclosed but seems to
use LSB flippings.
The JPHide&Seek (also denoted JPHS) algorithm by Latham [84] is available
on the web as binaries and source code, although its details have not been
published currently. From experiments performed in [56], it seems that it
mostly relies on LSBs flippings.
JSteg
JSteg is among the
first stegano
algorithms for JPEG.
JSteg by Upham [128] employs also LSB modifications, on quantized DCT
coefficients. It is among the very first steganography algorithms and simply
embeds the message bits directly into LSBs that are different from 0 and 1.
The LSBs used for changes were at first chosen in a sequential fashion, but
now use a pseudo-random path.
YASS
YASS uses a
de-synchronization
from the JPEG grid to
embed the message.
Yet Another Steganography Scheme (YASS) has been proposed recently by
Solanki et al. [119]. Its fame came from the fact that it was hardly detectable
by any known means, at the time. Since then, many papers have shown that
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it is detectable, for example by adapting the features used for the detection
scheme (using un-calibrated features, see section 3.3.4). Let us describe
shortly the concept of YASS.
The global idea is to embed the data in the spatial domain (before the
actual JPEG compression) using error correction codes, to resist the JPEG
compression. The de-synchronization vis a vis the typical 8× 8 JPEG grid
helps in hiding the message also. Five main steps describe the YASS (from
the original paper [119]):
1. Coding of the message: using a repeat-accumulate code [35], to resist
the JPEG compression.
2. Division into blocks: the cover image is divided into blocks of size
B × B, with B > 8, if 8 is the size of the JPEG blocks. This is for
de-synchronizing the message embedding vis a vis the JPEG grid.
3. For each block (of size B × B), a sub-block of size 8 × 8 is chosen
(pseudo-randomly, with a secret key shared by the sender and receiver).
4. For each of the sub-blocks (of size 8× 8), the 2D DCT transform is
computed (as for the JPEG compression step 4 in 2.4) and divided by a
quantization matrix for a specific quality factor QFh. The actual mes-
sage (encoded) is embedded in a predetermined band of low frequency
AC coefficients with Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) [26].
5. The sub-blocks are then brought back to the spatial domain before the
full image (which contains the message now) is finally compressed to
JPEG.
2.5 conclusion
In this chapter, we have described some of the concepts and notations used
in the steganography field. Typically, stego algorithms use one of the two
approaches mentioned — and sometimes both for improved security: the
model-based steganography approach, in which one tries to estimate the global
distribution of the media (images in this dissertation) and attempts to embed
a message in a way that the resulting medium still belongs to the global
distribution; and the coding-based approach where the emphasis is put on the
manner of coding the message to embed such that the distortions caused to
the medium by embedding are minimal.
We have then shortly described a promising extension of the typical stega-
nography use: the batch steganography [76], in which one attempts to hide
the message within a set of images, instead of just one.
We reviewed then the basic concept of the currently most used algorithms,
in steganography, some of then used in the publications included in this
dissertation (see publications C, D, E and F). Currently, all of these algorithms
are well detected (for reasonable message sizes, at least) by the use of various
sets of features extracted from the stego images.
The process of detecting whether an image is genuine (cover) or stego is
called steganalysis and is described in more details in the next chapter.
3STEGANALYS I S
Here we define the counterpart to steganography, steganalysis. We first discuss
the concept of security in steganography/ steganalysis, in a theoretical way
[23], which is unfortunately impossible to implement in reality at the moment.
The current framework in which steganalysis is inscribed, based on an
empirical estimation of the security through a specific setup, is discussed. We
finally present the different possible classes of steganalysis with some of the
classical steganalysis schemes used at the moment.
3.1 what is steganalysis
Before digital media appeared, the concept of steganalysis did not really exist.
For the steganography example (chapter 2) of the tattoo on the head of
Histiaeus’ slave, steganalysis would have consisted in looking at the slave
under all possible angles and try to guess (by the looks of it) whether there
could be a tattoo hidden on his scalp. Steganalaysis is not
like cryptanalysis:
only detection is at
stake here.
The concept of steganalysis is again very different from that of crypta-
nalysis (as steganography differs from cryptography): in cryptanalysis, the
aim is to “break the code” and then get the encoded message, simply put.
Steganalysis does not aim at obtaining the message hidden in the cover
medium, but only at detecting the mere presence of it. The original goal of
steganalysis was hence to give a binary answer to the question “Is there a
message hidden in this medium ?”. Figure 5 illustrates this simple idea.
Later on with the coming of digital media and the growing importance
of steganography, as discussed previously, the means of detecting stegano-
graphy have been developed along with other kinds of steganalysis. For
example one can cite the search for the stego-key used to embed the message,
which relates closely to cryptanalysis [51]. Before proceeding with some of
the different kinds of steganalysis that exist, let us remind why it is not an
obvious task at all.
Suspicious Image
Steganalysis
process
Genuine
Stego
Figure 5: The classical steganalysis process: a suspicious image is processed by means
of steganalysis to devise it genuine or stego (tampered).
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3.1.1 Kerckhoffs’ principle
As for cryptography, the Kerckhoffs principle can be applied to stegano-
graphy. In [77], Kerckhoffs stipulates in substance, that a cryptographic
algorithm should be able to withstand its principle being made public. That
is, the only secret that can be considered acceptable is the secret key shared
between sender and receiver. This key acts as a parameter of the crypto-
graphic algorithm.Steganalysis works
on supposeably
known stego
algorithms.
The idea is the same for steganography: only the stego-key shared by
sender and receiver can be considered as secret. The idea lying behind such
a strong design principle is that a brute force attack — trying out all possible
stego-keys to find the good one — against the stego scheme (to determine
the presence of the message or not) would be infeasible in terms of time
spent. If the space of stego-keys is large enough (and the stego algorithm has
no obvious weaknesses), this attack has very low probability to succeed [51],
due to the complexity of the search problem.
In this setup of a perfect stego algorithm (no weaknesses) and a large
enough stego-key space, the stego algorithm would be considered as secure.
We detail this concept of security for a stego algorithm in the following, as it
is of the utmost interest when considering steganalysis.
3.1.2 A definition of security for steganography
In the previous chapter 2 introducing steganography, we have brushed
the problem of embedding a message in a cover image while minimizing
the amount of distortions caused to it (see the section 2.3.2 about model-
based and coding-based schemes, for example). The concept of securitySecurity in
steganography is
theoretically
defined. . .
in steganography/steganalysis is related to this matter of the amount of
distortions.
The following concept of security makes the assumption that the trans-
mission channel does not introduce any distortion to the communicated
content. This also means that a potential eavesdropper will not attempt to
modify the content he monitors on the channel. This assumption on the
eavesdropper is often refered to as passive warden (from the famous problem
of the communication between two parties, typically Bob and Alice, and the
warden or eavesdropper, Eve). The other approach consists in considering an
active warden, who has the ability to modify the transmission and therefore
send virtually any content to the other parties communicating. We do not
consider this possibility in the rest of this dissertation.
With this assumption, Cachin in [23] defines the security of a stego algo-
rithm as the amount of differences that exist between the distributions PIc
and PIs of the two random variables Ic and Is (respectively the random vari-
able corresponding to the cover image and to the stego image) for an instance i.
The sample space of the cover images for the random variable Ic is denoted. . . using a KL
divergence between
image
distributions. . .
I. The “difference” between the distributions PIc and PIs is measured using
a Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence δ such that
δ(PIc ,PIs) =
￿
i∈Ic
PIc(i) log
PIc(i)
PIs(i)
, (3.1)
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which is a measure of the relative entropy between the two distribu-
tions. With this definition, Cachin defines a stego algorithm S as ε-secure if
δ(PIc ,PIs) ￿ ε, with Is being the random variable corresponding to the stego
images from algorithm S. Therefore, the smaller the ε, the closer are the two
distributions PIc , PIs and the harder it is to distinguish the suspicious image
from a genuine one.
In the case where ε = 0, the stego-algorithm is said to be secure, since no
difference can be made between the suspicious image and the genuine ones.
This definition poses unfortunately many problems in practice. First, the . . . but that definition
is not practically
usable.
size of the set of cover images |I| (|I| denoting the cardinal of the sample
space of the variable Ic) is potentially infinite; it suffices to take a new picture
with a camera to make it larger. Therefore, computing the KL divergence
over the whole set of cover images is computationally infeasible.
Second, this definition requires estimating the distributions PIc and PIs ,
which is most likely impossible to perform, for example because of the nature
of Ic.
These problems can be alleviated by the use of a set of features extracted
from the images, which dramatically reduces the dimensionality of the
problem and makes the marginals PIc and PIs possible to model.
Third, as pointed out by Pevny` in [97], there are no sufficiently good
estimators of the KL divergence to perform the computations. Indeed, even
though the size of the space of cover images |I| can be reduced, the KL
divergence estimators (for example the Kraskov one based on k-Nearest
Neighbors [83]) work properly for problems with dimensionality below 5. MMD is a possible
alternative to the KL
divergence.
A possible solution is proposed in [101] by the use of the Maximum
Mean Discrepancy (MMD), which measures the differences between two
probability distributions by drawing samples from both and using a witness
function behaving differently for samples of each distribution. The MMD is
then obtained as the difference between the mean witness function values on
samples of each distribution. The main advantage over the KL divergence
being that the MMD behaves well in high-dimensional spaces (large number
of features).
In order to assess the security (and thus the “quality”) of a stego algorithm,
practical steganalysis benchmarks are devised, through the use of features,
for example. Some of the features used widely in steganalysis benchmarks
are presented in section 3.3.
3.1.3 Measuring security empirically: benchmarking
We need to have
practical
benchmarking to
assess the security of
stego algorithms.
Setting up a practical steganalysis benchmark requires many choices in
design, choices on which the benchmark will possibly highly depend, unfor-
tunately.
restricting the image space First, since it is impossible to cover the
set of all possible images, one has to restrict the space of cover images to a
finite set. The choice of this set (both in terms of content and size of the set) It is not possible to
have all the existing
images. . .
might influence highly the results of the steganalysis, as demonstrated for
example in chapter 6 and Publication E (section 4.2.1).
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True Value
True Positive False Positive N ￿P
(TP) (FP)
Prediction False Negative True Negative N ￿N
(FN) (TN)
NP NN
Table 1: Confusion matrix for a binary classification problem.
extracting features Second, the choice of the characteristic features
(refered to as features in the following) extracted from each image. The goal. . . nor to model
images perfectly: we
use features.
of obtaining such features is to reduce the dimensionality of the space to
analyze. Although extracting features from an image i is a destructive process
(in that the projection from the image space to a lower dimensional feature
space is destructive in terms of information), one can hope that the extracted
features are descriptive enough that the most important information relevant
to steganalysis is preserved.
model A third parameter is the model chosen in order to discriminate
between stego and genuine, based on the previously devised features. In
most cases, a supervised machine learning model is used. Some of these
models are presented in the next chapter 4.
performance measure Finally, it is necessary to decide on what per-
formance to report. The most common measure of the security of a stego
algorithm is given by the ratio between the number Nident of correctly
identified images (as being either stego or cover) and the total number N
of images in the defined set. This is a particular measure known as theHow to measure the
security through the
benchmark?
accuracy, which can be derived from the confusion matrix obtained after a
binary classification problem (stego or cover). The classes of problems for
machine learning models are described in more details in chapter 4. Let us
describe the other possible practical measures of security in the framework
of a steganalysis benchmark, of which the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve is probably a good example.
The steganalysis problem can be assimilated to a binary classification,
for which the outcome stego is the positive class and the cover outcome the
negative class. Consider also that the set of N = NP +NN images contains
NP instances of the positive class (stego) and NN of the negative class (cover).
Denoting by N ￿P and N
￿
N the number of positive instances (resp. negative)
as classified by the model, the confusion matrix from Table 1 summarizes
the results.
The accuracy is therefore defined as TP+TNNP+NN . Unfortunately, the accuracyThe accuracy is aproper measure of the
performance. . .
does not account for the amount of false positives (or negatives) which can be
of great importance in the steganalysis framework: one might prefer catching
too many potential steganographers than missing them, for example.
The ROC curve plots the True Positive Rate TPNP versus the False Positive
Rate FPNN . Figure 6 gives an example of a ROC curve: the solid line indicates
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Figure 6: An example of ROC curve: the solid line represents the performance ob-
tained using a model in a steganalysis benchmark for a stego algorithm S,
while the dashed line is equivalent to random guess.
the evolution of the true positive rate when the false positive rate varies.
For some applications, it is preferable to sacrifice the False Positive rate to
obtain a better True Negative rate: it might be better for authorities to catch
too many potential steganographers than let some of them go, for example.
Some classification models allow this setting. . . . although the ROC
curve is more
informative.
While the ROC curve and/or the confusion matrix describe in much more
detail the outcome of the classification task in a steganalysis benchmark, the
accuracy remains the most commonly used measure, which we will use in
the following of the dissertation.
Now that the different parameters necessary for a typical steganalysis
benchmark have been presented, let us introduce the different variations
on steganalysis that currently exist. In the following, we will refer to a
steganalysis class to describe the general type of that steganalysis, and to a
steganalysis scheme for the practical way to perform the steganalysis (most of
the time, by extracting specific information in the form of features from the
suspicious image).
3.2 different classes of steganalysis
Although the primary steganalysis goal is to detect the mere presence of
a message in a suspicious medium, the field has evolved towards some
refinements, derived from the original idea. The original form (the binary The original problem
of steganalysis now
has subdivisions.
classification between cover and stego) could be qualified of qualitative ste-
ganalysis, although this terminology is not really used. Follow four other
types of steganalysis, which have rather different goals than the qualitative
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steganalysis. The next section 3.3 describes the practical schemes that can be
applied to the following classes.
3.2.1 Targeted steganalysis
The hypothesis of the targeted steganalysis is a strong one: the stegano-
graphic algorithm S used in known. This information is an important insightHere, the used stego
scheme is known,
following Kerckhoff’s
principle. This is a
strong assumption.
about how the steganalysis process should be designed. As discussed in the
previous chapter, for example, simple stego algorithms changing directly the
LSBs of DCT coefficients to embed the message (such as JSteg) will affect
visibly the histograms of such coefficients (again, given that the message to
embed is of sufficient size).
Most steganalysis schemes actually derive from this class: once a stego
algorithm is known (assuming its functioning is made public also), a stega-
nalysis scheme can be derived from the way the information is embedded,
as for the example of the LSBs of DCT coefficients previously [48, 80].
3.2.2 Blind steganalysis
Also called universal steganalysis, it is the exact opposite concept to that of
targeted steganalysis. This steganalysis also called universal aims at detecting
any kind of steganographic algorithm. See for example [100] for a recent
detector of most JPEG steganography schemes.Blind steganalysis
tries to infer the stego
scheme used, only.
This concept was introduced in [9], and more recently, a specific stega-
nalysis scheme made blind steganalysis much easier [46]. This scheme is
described at length in 3.3. The work by Fridrich et al. in [98] uses this scheme
for the elaboration of a blind steganalyzer (meant for JPEG images only) with
high efficiency for the JPHide, F5, MBsteg and Outguess stego algorithms.
3.2.3 Quantitative steganalysis
The quantitative steganalysis approach differs again from the original qual-
itative steganalysis in that it predicts the length of the message that has
been hidden in the cover medium. This is a very different problem from theThis class of
steganalysis estimates
the length of the
message.
classical binary classification one (cover or stego). The differences in terms of
models used to perform quantitative steganalysis are detailed in chapter 4.
Quantitative steganalysis has been first introduced by Chandramouli [24],
but rather few works have actually followed on this concept. In [50] a his-
togram of DCT coefficients approach is used, while the specific scheme
meant for blind steganalysis [99] is used in [103] for this quantitative task
and performs very well.
In the last publication present in this dissertation, publication F, this very
same scheme is used through a particular methodology for quantitative
steganalysis (see chapter 7).
3.2.4 Forensic steganalysis
Finally, the forensic steganalysis [53, 30] goes beyond the detection step of
the classical steganalysis: obtaining the actual hidden message. There are
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many possible reasons for which the eavesdropper would like to obtain the
message. The most obvious one is if such an eavesdropper has control over the The most wide
steganalysis class:
find out everything
about the message
(presence, length,
content. . . ).
transmission channel and can decide of shutting it down if steganography has
been detected. Instead of arousing suspicions from both sender and receiver
by merely cutting the transmission channel, the eavesdropper might want
to obtain the hidden message so that he knows exactly what is exchanged,
without catching the attention of the communicating parties.
In this sense, forensic steganalysis is closer to cryptanalysis than stegana-
lysis is. This specific part of steganalysis is not covered here, since it is rather
different from the usual goals of steganalysis. Most likely, though, one of the
very first steps a forensic steganalyzer would take is universal steganalysis,
to determine which stego algorithm he is dealing with in the first place. If
the identification of the stego algorithm works, it becomes either a matter of
breaking the scheme by trying all possible stego-keys (if the stego algorithm
requires one, this is the brute force approach), or use a weakness of the
algorithm to obtain the message. Using quantitative steganalysis to have It possibly also relates
to cryptanalysis.information about the length of the hidden message also gives important
clues for obtaining it.
Overall, forensic steganalysis makes use of the many other aspects of
steganalysis, and possibly of some of the cryptanalysis ones.
3.3 performing steganalysis : schemes
In order to perform in any of the classes of steganalysis presented, there is a
need for a practical scheme on how to actually do it: visually, by analyzing
the inner structure of the image, the statistics of the JPEG DCT coefficients. . .
Follows a presentation of historical schemes along with some of the most
recent and relevant ones, for the tasks of targeted, blind and quantitative
steganalysis.
3.3.1 Visual detection
The title of this type of steganalysis is quite explicit: the human eye is here
the model for classification. An image having visible discrepancies making it Use the human eye as
a detector of
discrepancies.
look suspicious or tampered, will be classified as stego. This simple form of
steganalysis is still efficient for very simple stego algorithms, for example
embedding the message by modifying largely the LSB of the DCT coefficients,
for a JPEG image. The first version of JSteg (see 2.4.2) with a sufficiently large
message would most likely create artefacts in the image that are visible to
the human eye.
In order to make invisible changes — invisible to the human eye, that is
— appear, Westfeld in [133] proposes to first filter a suspicious image (with
filters specific to each stego algorithm). The resulting filtered image has a
more obvious structure and renders the changes created by the embedding
of the message visible. Figure 7 from [133] illustrates visually this concept.
The left part shows the cover image (no message) after the filter (specific
to the stego algorithm) and the right one the same image with a message
embedded, also filtered. The visual difference is clear.
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Figure 7: An example of the visual detection using a filter specific to the stego
algorithm to reveal the modifications made to the cover image. Left is the
genuine cover image, filtered and right is the same image with an embedded
message, also filtered. From [133].
As mentioned in the previous chapter, though, most current algorithms
do not create any visual discrepancies and are thus impervious to visual
detection. Hence, one of the following statistics based steganalysis schemes
should be preferred in the general case, to the simple visual detection, in
order to obtain accurate detection. It should be noted, though, that careless
steganographers might cause visual distortions while using recent stegano-
graphy means, if the embedded message is too large, for example. In such
cases, visual detection can at least alert the steganalyzer.
3.3.2 First-order statistics based steganalysis
The problem of visual detection is that it relies on the human eye and on the
quality of the filter used, to identify steganography; as mentions Westfeld
in [133], this approach fails for elaborate enough schemes. In addition, for
cases not as obvious as the one in Figure 7, the reliability of the human
eye can be controversial. The need for clean, reliable statistics on which to
base the steganalysis decision initiated a trend in what is called feature-based
steganalysis.This scheme uses first
order statistics of the
image to
discriminate. . .
Feature-based steganalysis, of which all following schemes are instances,
relies on the extraction of certain characteristics of the suspicious image,
followed usually by a comparison with the characteristics of a base of cover
images. The base of cover images enables to obtain a “ground truth” about
the cover images, in terms of the characteristics considered. The point is not
to learn “what a cover image looks like”, but more precisely “what a cover
image looks like in terms of the characteristics chosen”.
This first scheme of steganalysis uses mainly histograms of pixel values,
and is therefore named Histogram attack. As described before, in the case of
LSB embedding, the LSBs are directly modified to embed the message. Con-. . . for example
histograms of pixel
values.
sider that the image is in grayscale format, i.e. the values of its pixels range
from 0 to 255 (8 bits to code the grayscale). In the case of LSB embedding,
the pixels with an odd value are decreased (or unmodified if it leads to a
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zero) and the pixels with an even value are increased (or unmodified if it
leads to a 1).
In this setup, an even pixel value and the following odd pixel value
(2j, 2j+ 1) are flipped during the embedding of the message bits. Such a pair
is called Pair of Values (PoV) and the whole histogram attack relies on these.
Denote by Hc = (H0c, . . . ,H255c )T the histogram values for all pixel values
of the cover image Ic (which has N pixels), and by Hs the same histogram,
for stego image Is. Denote by k the number of bits of the message m that
was embedded in Is. Assuming that the message is composed of random
bits (which can be achieved, by compressing it e.g.), it is possible to compute
the expected number E
￿
H2js
￿
of pixels with value 2j in Is,
E
￿
H2js
￿
= H2jc −
1
2
k
N
H2jc +
1
2
k
N
H2j+1c , (3.2)
since on average k2 bits already have the proper value vis a vis the message
m bits. The value for H2j+1s is obtained in the same fashion In the case of
embedding at full
capacity, the
steganalysis test with
histograms is
straightforward. . .
E
￿
H2j+1s
￿
= H2j+1c −
1
2
k
N
H2j+1c +
1
2
k
N
H2jc . (3.3)
Then, in the obvious case where k = N, that is a message bit has been
embedded in each pixel value, we have E
￿
H2js
￿
= E
￿
H2j+1s
￿
, which gives
2E
￿
H2js
￿
= H2js +H
2j+1
s from Equations 3.2 and 3.3 and it becomes easy in
this case to just test if H2js = H
2j+1
s to see if a message is embedded.
In less obvious cases (k ￿= N), the use of a χ2-test, for example Pearson’s,
permits by the computation of the p-value for the χ2-test to check whether
an image is stego or not, and to estimate the length of the message. By first
calculating the χ2 statistic X2 as
X2 =
d￿
j=1
￿
H2js − E
￿
H2js
￿￿2
E
￿
H2js
￿ , (3.4)
with d− 1 = 127 degrees of freedom (Hs =
￿
H0s , . . . ,H255s
￿T ). From the Otherwise the use of
a χ2-test permits to
perform it reliably.
previous analysis (k = N), the behaviour is here similar: a large value of
X2 means that the actual value of H2js does not follow the expected value
E
￿
H2js
￿
and therefore, that there is no message embedded. The reciprocal
goes for a small value of X2. A threshold has to be set on X2 to make the
final decision on the image being stego or cover.
The length of the message can then be determined by analyzing the
statistical significance of X2, by its p-value. As pointed out in [30], this only This approach enables
to estimate the
message length, with
some assumptions.
works if the “path” used for modifying the LSBs (i.e. the order in which they
have been modified), is known. Since some algorithms were performing the
LSB modifications in a predefined order, the following analysis can work. If
the path is known only to the sender and receiver (by the use of a stego-key),
the use of the p-value for the determination of the message length is not
possible.
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Figure 8: Example of the evolution of the p-value of a X2 statistic for a LSB embedding
stego scheme. Here the message was obviously embedded in the beginning
of the “path”. Inspired from [30].
The p-value for the statitic X2 is computed as
p
￿
X2
￿
=
￿
2
d−1
2 Γ
￿
d− 1
2
￿￿−1 ￿∞
X2
e−
t
2 t
d−1
2 −1dt, (3.5)
(with Γ denoting the gamma function Γ(y) =
￿∞
0 t
y−1e−tdt) which will be
of value 0 if there is no message in the considered pixel, and going towards
1 if there is a message. Hence, by monitoring the p-value along the path of
pixels, one gets the evolution depicted in Figure 8, for example (this is not
obtained from a real simulation).
The p-value starts to decrease dramatically once the pixels containing
message bits have been all visited, revealing hence the length of the original
message.
Again, this attack only works in the case where the path is either trivial
(the message is embedded into each LSB from the beginning of the image to
the end) or if one knows the non-trivial path. In practical cases, this does not
happen.This scheme is mostly
historical now. Stego
schemes are more
careful regarding the
first order statistics.
This simple histogram-based and χ2-test attack are only efficient for rather
simple stego schemes, or schemes for which the embedding path can be
devised — which is an important side-information. Recent stego schemes
escape such detection means by preserving as much as possible the first-order
statistics. The Outguess scheme, for example (see 2.4.2) tries to avoid this sort
of attacks by only embedding in half of the available LSBs. The remaining
half is meant to restore the distorted histograms of the DCT coefficients. As
for visual detection, such statistics can be considered as superseded by the
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following other schemes. Higher-order statistics have then been devised to
address these new algorithms escaping first order statistics detection.
3.3.3 RS steganalysis
The concepts for RS steganalysis are presented in [48]. The name of RS is
related to that of the pixel groups that are defined in this idea: Regular and
Singular. Here we use spatial
dependencies between
pixels to identify
discrepancies.
The main idea is to extend the first-order statistics to spatial dependencies:
the relationships between pixels (their values) are taken into account. Since
the embedding process in the LSBs changes many values, it most likely
increases the noise in the areas where a message is embedded. The goal is
to measure the amount of noise created in the overall image, proceeding
by small areas. For this purpose, the smoothness G of a set of pixels i =
(i1, . . . , in)T , with ij = i(xj,yj) (xj and yj describing the coordinates of the
pixel i(xj,yj) in the image i), is computed as
G (i) =
n￿
j=1
￿￿ij+1 − ij￿￿ . (3.6)
Obviously, the larger gets G, the noisier is the set of pixels i and the more
likely it is to hold a hidden message. Then, the LSB flipping process is
described by three functions, F1, F−1 and F0 such that (with pixel values in￿0, 255￿)
F1 : 0↔ 1, 2↔ 3, . . . , 254↔ 255
F0 : 0↔ 0, 1↔ 1, . . . , 255↔ 255
F−1 : −1↔ 0, 1↔ 2, . . . , 255↔ 256
. (3.7)
Using this notation, the potential pixel groups i are classified in three
groups
i is regular if G (F (i)) > G (i)
i is singular if G (F (i)) < G (i)
i is unchanged if G (F (i)) = G (i)
, (3.8)
from which it is clear that a regular group most likely has a message
embedded, compared to a singular group. Hence, after the embedding of
a message, the relative amount of regular groups (divided by the total
number of groups) R is larger than that of singular groups S. Estimates of
the evolution of these two amounts can be obtained from experiments for
varying amounts of LSB modifications. This approach can
also help estimating
the length of the
message, for
quantitative
steganalysis.
Comparing the R and S values obtained for a new suspicious image to
the curves obtained experimentally, enables to identify the image as stego
or cover (and have a message length estimate which is very accurate for
some stego algorithms, according to [48]). One can refer to [38] for a general
framework of RS steganalysis for LSB embedding.
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JPEG version Spatial cropped versionSpatial Domain version
4 pixels
4 pixels
JPEG version (cropped)
Figure 9: The calibration process as proposed in [46]: the considered image is first
decompressed to spatial domain, cropped horizontally and vertically by
4 pixels, here, and then re-compressed using the very same quantization
matrix and quality factor as that of the originally considered image.
3.3.4 Calibration-based steganalysis
One of the most useful information the steganalyzer could wish to get, for the
steganalysis to be made easier, is the original cover image. From it, estimating
whether the image has been tampered with would be very easy. While this
never comes true in practice (except if the sender is not careful regarding
the choice of the images), the cover image behavior and characteristics can
be estimated, by the process of calibration, for example. In [46], Fridrich et al.The calibration
process (decompress.
crop the image and
recompress) gives an
estimate of the cover
image’s features.
crop the image by a certain number of pixels in both vertical and horizontal
directions. The goal is to possibly “break” the inherent stego message lying in
the image, and thus regain access to image characteristics that are close to that
of the cover one. Figure 9 illustrates the idea: the suspicious image JPEG_1 is
first decompressed to the spatial domain, and then cropped horizontally and
vertically by n = 4 pixels (n can be different from 4). The resulting cropped
image is then recompressed into JPEG_2 using the very same parameters
(quantization matrix, quality factor) as that of JPEG_1.
Once both images are available, it is possible to compute a specific char-
acteristic F (inherent to the image) on both of them, and compare the two
values for example with the L1 norm ￿F (JPEG_1)− F (JPEG_2)￿L1 . With
the calibration in mind, most the previously existing features (first order
and higher order statistics, for example) are re-visited and deem significant
improvements when put together. In [46] is proposed a set of overall 23
functionals F to use with the calibration. This set of features is meant for
JPEG images exclusively, which are the only type of images considered in
this dissertation.
For the following, let us denote by I(k)(x,y) the quantized DCT coefficient
of coordinates (x,y) in the JPEG sub-block I(k) and the quantization matrix
for this image i (of which I is the DCT coefficients representation) by Q(x,y).
For the considered case, we have blocks of size 8× 8 and therefore 1 ￿ x,y ￿
8. Let us finally denote by B the total number of sub-blocks I(k), 1 ￿ k ￿ B
and by H (r) the histogram for DCT value r.A set of first and
second order features
is devised, to use with
calibration.
The first feature of this 23 feature set is the global histogram of DCT values
H = (H (1) , . . . ,H (R))T , with R = maxI(r).
As discussed before, the histogram attack can be countered (at least par-
tially), for example by the Outguess approach, where the distortions caused
to the global histogram of the LSBs are canceled by modifying the remain-
ing LSBs (no message embedded in it, though). In order to try and detect
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these modifications, individual histograms are used: the set of individual
histograms {hx,y(r)} for DCT coefficient (x,y) is added to the set. Only a
small number of these histograms is actually used, since only low frequency
DCT coefficients have zeros to embed message bits. In the end, the set
{hx,y(r), (x,y) ∈ {(1, 2) , (2, 1) , (2, 2) , (1, 3) , (3, 1)}} is used.
A last feature of the first order type is included, the “dual histograms”
gx,y(Idh), which are defined in [46] as the number of occurrences of the
DCT value Idh at the (x,y) DCT coefficient (for a fixed (x,y)) among all
sub-blocks of the DCT array I,
gx,y(Idh) =
B￿
k=1
δIdh,I(k)(x,y), (3.9)
where δa,b is the Kronecker symbol such that δa,b = 1 iff a = b and 0
otherwise.
Again, these dual histograms are only computed for certain DCT values,
namely −5 ￿ Idh ￿ 5.
These first-order features by definition only capture the dependencies
within each of the sub-blocks. The goal of the introduced second-order
features is to capture the dependencies between the sub-blocks of the image,
with the rationale that the stego algorithm has probably distorted them, even
if it managed to keep the inner sub-blocks dependencies rather similar to the
cover.
For that matter, the variation V , two types of blockiness B1 and B2 and three
measures N00,N01 and N11 based on the co-occurrence matrix of neighboring
DCT coefficients, are the final six features of the set. The variation
measures the
dependencies between
JPEG blocks.
The variation V capturing the dependency between neighboring sub-blocks
is
V =
1
|Irow|+ |Icol|
 8￿
x,y=1
|Irow|−1￿
k=1
￿￿￿I(Irow(k))(x,y)− I(Irow(k+1))(x,y)￿￿￿
+
8￿
x,y=1
|Icol|−1￿
k=1
￿￿￿I(Icol(k))(x,y)− I(Icol(k+1))(x,y)￿￿￿
,
(3.10)
with Irow and Icol being the vectors of sub-blocks indices while scanning
the image i by rows and columns, respectively. The blockiness
measures the inter
JPEG block
dependency over the
whole image.
Following are the two blockiness measures, B1 and B2. Bj is defined on
the decompressed (supposed gray-scale) JPEG image as
Bj =
1
N ￿(M− 1) /8￿+M ￿(N− 1) /8￿
 M￿
y=1
￿(N−1)/8￿￿
x=1
|i (8x,y)− i (8x+ 1,y)|
+
N￿
x=1
￿(M−1)/8￿￿
y=1
|i (x, 8y)− i (x, 8y+ 1)|j
 ,
(3.11)
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Global Histogram H/ ￿H￿
Individual histograms h1,2￿h1,2￿ ,
h2,1
￿h2,1￿ ,
h2,2
￿h2,2￿ ,
h1,3
￿h1,3￿ ,
h3,1
￿h3,1￿
Dual histograms g(−5)￿g(−5)￿ ,
g(−4)
￿g(−4)￿ ,. . . ,
g(4)
￿g(4)￿ ,
g(5)
￿g(5)￿
Variation V
Blockinesses B1,B2
Co-occurrences N00,N01,N11
Table 2: The 23 DCT feature set [46].
where i(x,y) denotes the gray-scale value (not a DCT value) of pixel (x,y)
for the image i of dimensions N×M.
Finally, the three last featuresN00,N01 and N11 are computed out of the
co-occurrence matrix C of neighboring DCT coefficients, of which element
(u, v) is given by
C(u, v)=
1
|Irow|+ |Icol|
|Irow|−1￿
k=1
8￿
x,y=1
δu,I(Irow(k))(x,y)δv,I(Irow(k+1))(x,y)
+
|Icol|−1￿
k=1
8￿
x,y=1
δ
u,I(Icol(k))(x,y)δv,I(Icol(k+1))(x,y)
.
(3.12)
The three features are then computed from C asThese measure the
spreading of the
values of the
co-occurrence matrix. N00 = C
JPEG_1(0, 0)−CJPEG_2(0, 0)
N01 = CJPEG_1(0, 1)−CJPEG_2(0, 1)
+CJPEG_1(1, 0)−CJPEG_2(1, 0)
+CJPEG_1(−1, 0)−CJPEG_2(−1, 0)
+CJPEG_1(0,−1)−CJPEG_2(0,−1)
N11 = CJPEG_1(1, 1)−CJPEG_2(1, 1)
+CJPEG_1(1,−1)−CJPEG_2(1,−1)
+CJPEG_1(−1, 1)−CJPEG_2(−1, 1)
+CJPEG_1(−1,−1)−CJPEG_2(−1,−1)
(3.13)
with CJPEG_1 being the co-occurrence matrix of image JPEG_1 and simi-
larly for JPEG_2.
This finally gives a set of 23 features, summarized in Table 2. Note that the
histograms features are normalized.
Using such a set, most of the existing stego algorithms are detected. Thanks
to the use of first and second order statistics and most of all, to the calibration
process, this steganalysis is very successful.
Later on, in [99], the set is extended (by removing the normalization and
taking all the values from the co-occurrence matrix C) to a much larger 193
DCT features set.
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This extended set is widely used in the presented publications in this
dissertation. First, because the DCT features actually have a direct meaning,
that is, they are not the result of a projection or transformation that would
destroy the original physical sense. In this respect, they are interpretable,
subject to feature selection, for example, as demonstrated in publications
C (sections 5.3 and 5.4), D (sections 4.2 and 4.3) and E (sections 4.3 and
4.4). And second, because the large number of its features makes it a good
candidate to such feature selection, which is important in steganalysis (see
chapter 6 for details).
It is worth noting, finally, that a recent stego algorithm, the YASS, is not
being properly detected by the DCT features if using the calibration process
[80]. Using the un-calibrated version of the features though, provides better
results (the calibration is called Cartesian calibration in [80], since it uses
the Cartesian product of the features for JPEG_1 and JPEG_2). Overall, the
calibration process is working especially well for stego algorithms which
tend to respect the JPEG block structure. The calibration process “breaks” the
original structure of the image and therefore the stego structure embedded.
Algorithms such as YASS, for example, using de-synchronization regarding
the JPEG blocks are not directly affected by the calibration process.
3.3.5 Markov-based steganalysis
The so-calledMarkov-based features are derived in [116] by the use of a Markov
process to model the dependencies between the differences of the JPEG
DCT values. From the original publication, this scheme clearly outperforms
the previously presented calibrated DCT features. From the principle that
many experts are better than just one, to make a decision, both approaches
have recently been combined, into a large 324 features set, using both DCT
and Markov-based calibrated features. The results outlined in [99] again
outperform previous schemes. The dependencies
between pixels are
modeled as Markov
processes.
Let us present quickly the concept of the Markov-based features. In the
original publication [116], the authors state and show empirically that there
is a high correlation between the absolute values of DCT coefficients along
the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions. The goal of the Markov
process is to model these dependencies and use the values of the transition
probability matrix as features (actually a reduced subset of the transition
probability matrix).
Denoting again I(x,y) the value of the DCT coefficient (and therefore
|I(x,y)| its absolute value) at position (x,y) in the image i with N rows and
M columns (i.e. 1 ￿ x ￿ N and 1 ￿ y ￿ M), the so-called difference arrays
of DCT coefficients for horizontal direction Fh, vertical direction Fv, main
diagonal direction Fd and minor diagonal direction Fm are obtained as
Fh(x,y) = |I(x,y)|− |I(x+ 1,y)| ,
Fv(x,y) = |I(x,y)|− |I(x,y+ 1)| ,
Fd(x,y) = |I(x,y)|− |I(x+ 1,y+ 1)| ,
Fm(x,y) = |I(x+ 1,y)|− |I(x,y+ 1)| ,
(3.14)
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from which the actual transition probability matrices Mh,Mv,Md and
Mm for the four directions are
Mh(j, k) =
￿N−2
x=1
￿M
y=1 δFh(x,y),jδFh(x+1,y),k￿N−1
x=1
￿M
y=1 δFh(x,y),j
,
Mv(j, k) =
￿N
x=1
￿M−2
y=1 δFv(x,y),jδFv(x,y+1),k￿N
x=1
￿M−1
y=1 δFv(x,y),j
,
Md(j, k) =
￿N−2
x=1
￿M−2
y=1 δFd(x,y),jδFd(x+1,y+1),k￿N−1
x=1
￿M−1
y=1 δFd(x,y),j
,
Mm(j, k) =
￿N−2
x=1
￿M−2
y=1 δFm(x+1,y),jδFm(x,y+1),k￿N−1
x=1
￿M−1
y=1 δFm(x,y),j
,
(3.15)
of which only the central 9× 9 part of each matrix is taken (since taking the
full sized matrix would yield a too large number of features). The resulting
set has hence 4× (9× 9) = 324 features. As said, in [99], Fridrich proposes to
apply the calibration procedure to these features, resulting in an improvement
of the performances.
The Markov approach is rather successfull for classical stego algorithms,
but would again most likely fail for the YASS case. In [86], Bin et al. indicate
that Markov-based features would probably work on the original version
of YASS for the location of the embedding blocks is not truly random and
hence altered dependencies between DCT coeffcients could be detected. A
version of YASS using truly random location for the blocks would on the
contrary probably not be detectable by the Markov approach.
3.3.6 SPAM features
The last discussed steganalysis scheme is proposed by Tomàš Pevny` in
[102] and named SPAM features, for Substractive Pixel Adjacency Matrix. The
SPAM features are meant in the first place for the steganalysis of the YASS
stego algorithm and globally for LSB embedding based schemes. The ideaMarkov processes are
also used to model
more directions in the
image.
is closely related to that of the previously described scheme: modeling the
difference arrays (this time in the spatial domain, though) with Markov
processes, of first and second order. The main difference here is that the
difference arrays are computed along “both” directions for horizontal (left
and right), vertical (up and down), main diagonal and minor diagonal. As in
the original publication, we denote by arrows each of these eight directions
{←,→, ↑, ↓,￿,￿,￿,￿}.
Using the same notation as in the previous section, denote by F→(x,y) =
I(x,y)− I(x,y+ 1) the difference array for the first direction (the remain-
ing seven are defined in the same fashion). Again, the first order Markov
transition probability matrix is given by
M→(j, k) = P (F→(x,y+ 1) = j|F→(x,y) = k) , (3.16)
with the same sort of restriction on the values of j and k (restricted to a set￿−T , T￿, with T = 4 for these first order in the original publication).Markov transition
probability matrices
are computed for first
and second order
transitions.
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The second order one is then
M→(j, k, l) = P (F→(x,y+ 2) = j|F→(x,y+ 1) = k, F→(x,y) = l) , (3.17)
also with j, k and l restricted to ￿−3, 3￿ for these second order features. This
restriction is again meant to reduce the dimensionality of the feature set
(which is already 686 features for the second order case).
The final features sets of first order F(1) and of second order F(2) are
obtained through
F(j) =
￿
1
4
￿
M→ +M← +M↓ +M↑
￿
;
1
4
￿
M￿ +M￿ +M￿ +M￿
￿￿
,
(3.18)
being the concatenation of the vectors of features. The first (resp. second)
order term lies inside the M notation, for simplicity of notations here (as
depicted in Equations 3.16 and 3.17). The final feature set
is a concatenation of
direct directions and
diagonal ones.
As pointed out by Pevny` in [102], the order of the Markov process and
the threshold T control the extent of the space of features (the complexity of
the Markov model). If one has a good classification model to discriminate
by using such large number of features (and sufficient computational power,
along with a very large database of images), it would be possible to go
beyond the thresholds proposed here. These problems are presented in
the next chapter 4 and experimentally illustrated in chapter 6 (referring to
publications C, D and E).
3.3.7 Undiscussed schemes
As for the review of stego algorithms in the previous chapter, this presented
list of steganalysis schemes is by no means exhaustive. It only attempts to
cover some the most widely recognized and used steganalysis schemes, for
their meaningfulness and innovative aspects. A more thorough covering of
steganalysis schemes can for example be found in [47].
3.4 a pitfall in steganalysis
In the previous discussion, we have dealt with features sets of growing size:
only the histogram of DCT values, for the histogram attack, then followed
by the 23 features of the original calibrated DCT set, expanded to 193 later
on; the merging of the Markov-based set of 324 features, with the 193 ones
from the DCT set into a 517 features set (brought down to 274), and finally
the SPAM ones, which lead to potentially very large feature sets (686 for a
“restricted” second order Markov process).
All these feature sets are clearly getting larger, and the evolution is likely
to be on the growing slope in the future: one wants to capture as many char-
acteristics of the images in order to model them better and better, and thus
make a “cleaner” difference between stego and cover — a better steganalysis.
The recent trend — giving very promising results in terms of performances
for the steganalysis — seems to be in combining the sets of features, in order
40 steganalysis
to better cover the different domains in which the image characteristics are
expressed. This will also lead to larger and larger feature sets to analyze.The growing size of
feature sets can be a
problem in Machine
Learning. . .
Although this issue will be discussed more lengthily in the next chapter 4,
the number of samples has to grow along with the number of features used.
This problem is one of the famous Curse of Dimensionality and is not the only
one related to the growth of the feature space.
Intuitively, we need to have larger number of features and larger number
of samples, to accommodate the Curse. Therefore, the overall data set —
the matrix holding in each column a different feature and in each row a
different image — is growing exponentially (see section 6.1.1 for more details
on high-dimensionality related problems).
One obvious problem is then to have a classification or regression model
that can accommodate such large data sets in reasonable computational time:
no one wants to wait weeks to extract the features out of a base of images,
and then train a model to finally be able to predict on a few images, whether
steganography has been performed.
3.5 conclusion
The concept of security in steganography/ steganalysis is classicaly defined in
an information-theoretic sense, by measuring the “differences” between the
cover image (original) and the stego one (with an embedded message). Since
this theoretical definition contains quantities too difficult to estimate, the
typical steganalysis framework reverts to an approximation for the estimation
of the security. This estimation is most often based on the use of a certain
amount of characteristics descriptive of the image considered, the features.
Using these features with a machine learning model enables to obtain an
estimation whether an image is cover or stego. The drawback of the feature-
based steganalysis is similar to the commonly encountered problem in
Machine Learning: the growing dimensionality (corresponding to the number
of features) — and therefore the global size of the data.
The next part (chapters 4 and 5) of this dissertation first presents a short
state of the art in Machine Learning (mostly directed towards regression and
classification problems, which are of interest for the steganalysis problem) in
chapter 4, followed by the presentation of a new model for which training
is fast enough to manage the large data sets coming from steganalysis, for
example: the Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine (chapter 5 and
publications A and B).
Part II
A FAST, EFF IC IENT AND ROBUST MACHINE
LEARNING TECHNIQUE : OP -ELM

4A SHORT REVIEW ON MACHINE LEARNING
In an attempt to summarize the vast field of Machine Learning into a few
key concepts most relevant to the steganalysis and steganography related
problems, we propose in this chapter to first define precisely the steganalysis
classes of problems in machine learning terminology. We refine the overview
proposed in this chapter to supervised binary classication and supervised regres-
sion, which are the two very specific cases of machine learning problems at
interest in this dissertation.
We also propose an established “procedure” to properly train, validate,
build and test a machine learning model, on the general case. Finally, the
machine learning models used in the publications of this dissertation are
presented, with references to other famous related models.
4.1 learning problems
4.1.1 What is Machine Learning
It takes a new born between 6 and 24 months on average [91] to say its first
(intelligible) words. The whole process of learning pronunciation, language
structure, word construction and so on, takes even longer than this and
is potentially a lifetime training and evolution. If we think about it, the
amount of data to process for a baby’s brain is tremendous. Only for the
language part of the learning, it requires the processing of the mouth muscle
movements (imitation of the surrounding people), remembering sequences
of phonemes to create words, and associating these words with a context
and content. Machines probably
lack the
computational power
— yet — to process
enough data to be able
to imitate the brain.
A human brain can apparently do this. At the time of this dissertation,
a machine cannot. Although advances in voice synthesis and language
modeling have enabled the creation of systems that seem to be human when
asked questions, we are still very far from creating an actual structure able
to learn a whole human-type language by itself.
The idea of mimicking human abilities such as the language, by machines is
globally named Artificial Intelligence, of whichMachine Learning is a sub-class.
Machine Learning only aims at learning, that is to say, observe examples of a
specific phenomenon in order to model its underlying process. If a sufficiently
good model for this phenomenon is found, new examples can be used, either
to make the model learn new insights on the phenomenon, or predict what
happens for these specific examples.
The example given in the introductory part of [6] is interesting because
it covers most of the aspects of the machine learning problem. Consider
an important supermarket chain, having many shops throughout many
countries. In order to advertise the right kind of products at the right time
and to the right customer, they need to know what customers buy, when and
possibly why. The cashiers’ terminals are recording all this information about
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what is bought, when and by which customer, and in the case of millions of
customers everyday, this can create terabytes of data in a day or so.Machine learning
tries to extract an
underlying
generating process
from the data.
In all this data, only a small amount of information is actually relevant and
useful, for example for advertising purposes. The aim of machine learning
(precisely data mining, in this case) is then to identify a pattern, an underlying
process in the data: most likely indeed, customers are not buying the products
at random. While it is obviously a very hard task (if possible at all) to
model completely a customer’s behavior based on this data, a good enough
approximation of the behavior is sufficient already. And once we know that
Mr. Muumipeikko buys chocolate-based products during the dark days of
winter and beer and sausages when the first days of summer approach,
it becomes easier to target the advertising and the offers for that specific
customer.
In the steganalysis framework, the idea is to obtain a model of what
an image looks like, in terms of the data we extract from it (the features).
Provided that the model can learn the difference between a cover image and
a stego image, in the classical qualitative steganalysis case, we can identify
suspicious images as being stego properly.
4.1.2 Classes of learning problems
In this dissertation, we consider that a problem is described by a data set,
which takes the form of a matrix x, called inputs (or input data). Other meansA problem is reduced
to the data acquired
from it, with samples
and variables/
features.
of structuring the input data such as tensors or databases are not considered
here. The typical formulation uses the rows of x as samples (examples of the
observed phenomenon, being images in the steganalysis case), and columns
as variables (or features, to refer to the steganalysis terminology). The data
set is usually acquired from a specific source, either by measuring directly
some quantities (steganalysis is in this case), or obtained from a supposeably
reliable source.
Reliable and relevant data
In the following, we consider the data to be reliable. This means that we do
not consider the possibility that part of the data is wrong (in the sense that
it would describe the phenomenon improperly), or missing (some values
missing for some samples).
The concept of missing values in machine learning is by itself a whole
branch of the field and will not be discussed in this dissertation. One can
refer for example to [89, 121, 90, 120] for a bibliography and insights on that
specific problem.The data is supposed
to be reliable but not
necessarily relevant.
The problem of having “wrong” data is difficult to define, but let us clarify
the assumption made here. By “wrong”, it is meant that the considered part
of the data is trying to mislead voluntarily the model. For example, if two
sensors are measuring the same phenomenon, but one of them has an in-
verted polarity compared to the other, we would try to model a phenomenon
based on its behavior (first correct sensor) and the opposite of it (second
inverted sensor).
Data that is irrelevant to the task (for example some random noise or the
outdoor temperature for a steganalysis problem) is not considered as “wrong”
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data. The problem of determining if data is relevant is brushed in section 6
about dimensionality reduction, which is a means of discarding such data
from the original data set.
It is a reasonable assumption to suppose that we do not have “wrong” data
in the steganalysis framework: the samples (the images) have to be properly
selected so that they are natural images and not some pure random noise or
some other digital object disguised as an image; and the features presented
in chapter 3 are clearly sensible (although there might be redundancy in
them, e.g.).
Given this setup, one can define two main classes of learning problems, in
machine learning, the unsupervised and the supervised ones.
Unsupervised learning
This specific class of learning makes the assumption that only the data x is
available, and tries to infer an underlying structure/behavior in this data. Unsupervised
learning aims at
finding a structure in
the data without any
output information.
A classical example of this class is the problem of Blind Source Separation
(BSS) [73], of which the so-called cocktail party problem is an instance. Imag-
ine a cocktail hall where a party is being held, with many invitees speaking
together at the same time. In the resulting “noise” from the simultaneous
talking, separating each of the voices seems a very hard task (although it
seems that humans can identify two voices simultaneously and separate
them clearly from the rest [118]). In this case, the rows of the data matrix x
are the recorded signals in the cocktail hall, while the columns correspond to
the sampling of the sound recorded. The Independant Component Analysis
(ICA) [73, 29] algorithm enables to isolate the sources s such that x = w · s
(with w being the mixing matrix, in the linear noiseless ICA case), provided
that there are enough recorded signals.
Another use of unsupervised learning is clustering. This class of learning
problem aims at separating the data as best as possible, so as to create clus-
ters. In the previously mentioned example of the supermarket selling goods
across many countries, it might be of interest to find groups of customers
with specific behaviors to analyze: some “expected” groups with identified
similar behaviors will be easier to target in terms of selling strategies, while
unexpected groups formed in the clustering process may reveal the unex-
pected behaviour of a part of the population. Which this time would lead to
a new, more adapted and specific selling strategy.
Supervised learning
This second class of learning problem is the one considered in the rest of this
dissertation. Supervised learning
assumes the existence
of a teacher.
In this case, the presence of a teacher (supervisor) is assumed, in addition
to the data x, so that the model can be trained using a reference for each of
the samples in x. This teacher usually takes the form of another matrix, of
outputs denoted by y.
For the context of qualitative steganalysis, for example, y is a vector consti-
tuted by elements depicting two classes: the first one coding for the image
state “stego” and the second one for “cover”. For quantitative steganalysis, it
is a vector of positive real values, each representing the message size for each
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sample (image). The difference between these two problems is discussed in
the following subsection 4.1.3.
4.1.3 Structure of the supervised learning problem
With the assumption of a supervised learning problem, we can define two
types of supervised learning, each of them with a different type and size of
the output matrix y.
The first type of supervised learning is called regression. In this case, the
output y is a vector of generally real values, to be predicted. This means that
the model M predicts values in R:
M : RN×M −→ R, (4.1)
with N the number of samples and M the number of features (variables).
This type is the one of quantitative steganalysis, for example. The problem isThe classical problem
formulation in terms
of approximation for
regression.
usually formulated as
y = f (x) +N (0,Σ) , (4.2)
with Σ the covariance matrix for the zero-mean noise N (0,Σ) and f
the “process” underlying in the data x. The model M hence tries to best
approximate f.
The second one is classification, already mentioned in chapter 3 for the
qualitative steganalysis problem. This time, the outputs y are categorical and
can be of two different types: nominal or ordinal. Nominal outputs have no
sense of order between them. For example, coding blue as 1, red as 2 and
green as 3, one cannot sort the values 1, 2, 3 with some standard ordering
operation. The numerical attribute to code the meaning is here purely a
commodity for manipulating the data.There are two types of
classification data:
ordinal and nominal.
The ordinal outputs have a sense of order; for example, the age of a person,
expressed in full years. In the end, both classification outputs (ordinal and
nominal) y can be expressed as being in N. In this dissertation, we only
consider nominal outputs for the classification problem (qualitative steganalysis).
Moreover, we restrict the nominal type to being only a binary classification
output. The case of a multi-class classification problem can be rather complex
and is not discussed here, although it is used in the blind steganalysis
approach (see section 3.2). Eventually, it can be brought back to a binary
classification problem using multi-outputs: consider a problem with classes
in ￿1, 3￿ , one can code each of the classes as following, using the binary
choice of classes ￿0, 1￿:
1 −→ [0 0 1]
2 −→ [0 1 0]
3 −→ [1 0 0]
(4.3)
It can be argued that predicting a single value (single output problem) in
the ￿1, 3￿ range is different from predicting an output like [0 0 1] for example
(multi-output problem), since one predicts three outputs at once then. The
possibilities of multi-output problems — y being a matrix and no longer a
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vector — are not discussed in this dissertation and the previous example is
merely meant to illustrate a possibility of dealing with multi-classes problem.
Only binary classification ones are in the scope of this dissertation. One We only consider
binary classification
here.
can refer to [104] and [5] for recent improvements in dealing with multi-
class problems and to [6] for a state of the art and modifications of classical
machine learning models for the multi-class case.
4.1.4 Building a model for the learning problem
With the learning problem fixed (regression or classification) it is possible to
build a model and train it on that particular data. The process of building a Four steps to build a
model.model requires at least four steps: selecting the model class, the model structure,
build the model and finally validate these choices. An additional fifth step (if
the data is available for it) can be used, to further ensure about the quality of
the model on unused data; this is the test part. Each step is detailed in the
following.
Choosing the model class
The model class selection is the first step and is primarily an informated
choice on the user side: some models are meant for unsupervised learning
and will obviously not be appropriate here; some other models are known
to have strong limitations regarding irrelevant or correlated data (e.g., in
the case where two or more features are describing the same part of the
phenomenon in the very same fashion); and some models are known to
be better than others on some specific problems for which they have been
designed in the first place (see chapter 5 and Reservoir Computing for
time-variant processes, for example). An informated a
priori decision is
required to select the
model class.
In the end, the user has to decide a priori which model M to use among
the large choice that exists. Section 4.3 gives a few examples of some famous
model classes, and therefore, often used, especially in the framework of
steganalysis.
Model structure selection and error criterion
Choosing the model structure is intimately related with the next step, the
model validation.
A model has usually a certain number of hyper-parameters, which relate to
the model structure design choices (for example the order of a polynomial
curve to fit to the data) and parameters which have to be determined using
the data itself (the coefficients of the polynomial curve of fixed order). We need to find the
right
hyper-parameters for
the model. . .
The parameters of a modelM are therefore part of the building of the model
and their determination requires to use the data.
The goal of this step is to find a possible optimal set of l hyper-parameters
Θ = (θ1, . . . , θl) such that the model M (x,Θ) makes the smallest error on
the data x, regarding the output y. The error εr in regression can be defined
by a risk function frisk which will quantify how far the model’s estimation
yˆ = M (x,Θ) for a specific fixed set of hyper-parameters Θ is from the real
value y
εr = frisk (yˆ,y) = frisk (M (x,Θ) ,y) . (4.4)
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For the case of a regression learning problem (single output), the function
f is typically a Mean Squared Error (MSE) risk function, that is
frisk (yˆ,y) = fMSE (yˆ,y) =
1
N
N￿
j=1
￿
yˆj − yj
￿2 , (4.5)
where yˆj is the j-th component of the vector yˆ = (yˆ1, . . . , yˆN)T , the model’s
estimation and similarly for y. For the following of the dissertation, we also. . . and for that we
need a criterion to
evaluate the model
performance.
define the Normalized Mean Square Error (NMSE) [58] as the MSE normalized
by the variance of the output y,
fNMSE(yˆ,y) =
fMSE(yˆ,y)
var (y)
. (4.6)
Note that in the case where the prediction yˆ is the mean of y, the NMSE is
1 meaning that the prediction is poor (note also that a NMSE can be larger
than 1, for models giving a worse prediction than the mean of y. . . ).
In the same spirit, one can define an error for the binary classification
problem, assuming that we are interested in having the highest accuracy, as
defined in 3.1, by the ratio
Acc =
TP+ TP
NP +NN
, (4.7)
with TP and TN the amounts of true positive and negative, respectively,
and NP (and NN) the total numbers of positive (respectively negative) in-
stances. The error εc in classification can then be defined as
εc = 1−Acc, (4.8)
which can be expressed in percentage, and corresponds to the “percentage
of incorrect classification” intuitively. Note that the problem of minimizing
ε is very different for the regression and classification cases presented here.
Actually, most models will preferably minimize the MSE εr, even for the
classification case, and eventually report the classification error εc obtained
using the same hyper-parameters Θ = Θr that minimize the MSE. This can
for example be due to historical reasons where the original model’s algorithm
was meant only for regression problems, minimizing the MSE and has later
on been adapted to classification problems.
It is not a real issue to minimize the MSE for a binary classification problem,
since there are only two classes in y. Minimization of the MSE leads anyway
to minimizing the discrepancies between yˆ and y.
Building the model
This step is usually straightforward on the user side. With a fixed model
class and set of hyper-parameters, the model can be built on the data x and
is then ready to be used on other data: the model parameters are determined
in this step, through the model’s internal structure.
An important part of the model building requires to separate the original
data set x so that building the model and validating it happen on two different
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subsets of the original data. One could say that the hyper-parameters (“exter-
nal” to the model) are optimized to minimize the validation error, while the
parameters (“internal” to the model) are devised to minimize the training
error, computed during the model building.
Validation of the model
Now that we have defined a way to measure the error (and hence, a criterion
to obtain an optimal set of hyper-parameters for the model), let us have a
practical approach on how to manage the data to evaluate the error ε for
different sets of hyper-parameters Θ.
Originally, we can assume that we have a unique data set x containing all
the available data about the phenomenon: in steganalysis, we have N rows,
each containing the features (in the M columns) of the N images of the base
of images. The model should be
validated on data not
used for training
then.
In order to estimate the modelM for a fixed set of hyper-parameters Θ, we
need learning data xl, which will be a subset of the whole data x. The model
is built on xl and the learning error εl is computed εl = M (xl,Θ). For most
classes of models in machine learning, it is possible to have εl > 0 as small
as possible, given enough time to find the correct set of hyper-parameters
Θ = Θl that minimizes sufficiently εl. The problem is then that the model
has also learned the noise that is present in the data: real data, that is obtained
from actual phenomena, always has noise in it — a part that should not
be modeled. The over-fitting effect occurs, then. Figure 10 illustrates this
problem: the model depicted by the solid line approximates the “idea” of the
data, the global behavior of it, while the one represented by the dashed line
only tries to fit to all the points, thereby losing the sense of the data itself.
This issue can be overcame by the use of a validation set. Instead of eval-
uating the performance of the model M on the learning data itself only, a
different part of the data is used to validate the model, that is, evaluate its
error on different data than that used for training.
Going back to our full data set x, we need to divide it beforehand into two
different sets xl (of cardinal Nl = |xl|) for the learning part of the model,
and xv (of cardinal Nv = |xv|) to validate the model. The use of new data
(i.e., never seen by the model during the training) helps in estimating the
error of the model with such hyper-parameters Θ properly: an over-fitting
of the model on the training data creates inevitably (if the validation data
is different from the training one) a large error on the validation set. Hence,
the set of hyper-parameters has to be modified so that the model generalizes
well on the new data.
This approach has a strong drawback: it requires dividing the original data
set into two subsets. Whenever the data is either scarce or costful to acquire,
this can be a serious problem. In such cases, cross-validation can be used, to For example, using
k-fold
cross-validation, the
model is validated on
unused data.
replace the standard validation.
Cross-validation is usually performed in a k-fold way, where k determines
the number of parts into which the data will be divided. Figure 11 presents a
case of 3-fold cross validation scheme. The whole data x is divided into three
equal sets, of which the first third (colored in the Figure) will be used as
validation data xv, and the remaining two thirds for learning xl. The process
is repeated k = 3 times, for this example, and the average error on the three
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Figure 10: The over-fitting concept: the solid line depicts a model approximating the
underlying phenomenon behind the data (black dots), while the dashed
line just tries to fit the data completely.
runs is reported. Obviously, the number of times one needs to repeat the
learning and the validation is equal to k which can be problematic for models
that require large computational time.Leave-One-Out is the
limit case k =N
and gives a good
estimate of the
validation error.
In the limit case k = Nwhere the number of folds is the number of samples
available in x, the k-fold is called Leave-One-Out (LOO) cross-validation.
Using this scheme enables to have a very good idea of the validation error
that would be achieved on different data, since each point is in turn taken
out of the learning set xl and evaluated in validation. This is also the most
costly approach to cross-validation, although in some cases, a closed form
formula for the LOO error [94] can be devised and permits a fast evaluation
(compared to running k = N times the learning and validation).
Model test
Finally, the model M for which the best set of hyper-parameters Θv has
been obtained (regarding the error criterion in validation) can be tested. It
should be noted that the test data is again different from the learning and
the validation data, and should be taken separately in the first place.In the end, it is good
to test the final model
on totally unused
data.
This test data can be taken from the original data set x, to check if the model
behaves well on totally new data (unseen before, both for validation and
learning), or be data that has been acquired/obtained since. The test error εt
is the proper error to be reported, if one refers to the performance of a model
on some data set x. Training and validation errors cannot be considered as
a proper measure of performance of the model M, even though the LOO
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Figure 11: Example of 3-fold cross-validation: the whole data x is divided into three
parts. The first part is used for validation (red) and the rest (white) for
learning. Once done, the second part is used for validation and the first
and third for learning. . .
error in validation can be considered to be a rough approximation of the
real validation error — which would be obtained given an infinite validation
set — if the data set is large enough (N −→∞). In [110, 33, 34] this claim is
proved theoretically for some specific models (see [74] for a more thorough
review and a broader view of the matter). Bootstrapping is a
concept similar to
cross-validation.
Overall, the cross-validation idea is rather close to that of bootstrapping
in statistics [39], where the properties of an estimator are estimated through
multiple sampling from an approximated distribution. Usually a random
subset (with replacements) of the original data set is taken, on which the
estimator is devised. Multiple repetitions of this process (assuming the
number of samples available in the first place is large enough) permit to have
a mean value for the estimator. Please refer to [39] for a full reference on the
matter of boostrapping.
In the same fashion as for the cross-validation, one can consider the
possibilty of cross-test, in case the data set x is again small. Doing so is
discussed in the following.
4.2 practical notes on data processing for model building
These are practical
notes giving one way
to pre-process the
data for building a
model.
Here are compiled a few notes on taking care of the data before building
a model and searching for an optimal set of hyper-parameters. They are
mentioned to explain the procedure through which data has been handled,
for the proposed publications, in this dissertation.
• It is a good idea to make a random permutation of the data set (inputs
and outputs in the same way) before starting anything. The original Take a random
permutation of the
original data.
data set might have been sorted for some reason and the following
division of the data set would lead to learning and validating on non-
homogeneous data. In the steganalysis framework, for example, if all
natural images depicting trees are in the beginning and sky shots in
the end, we encounter the risk of having a model too specialized in one
type of images, which will behave incorrectly on other types.
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• One also wants to normalize the data, for some models (zero mean
and unit standard deviation, for example). By normalizing, it is meantNormalize the data
using the learning
normalization factors.
for each of the columns of x, the features, separately. A simple illus-
tration is for a model based on the Euclidean distance (for example a
k-Nearest Neighbors, see 4.3): if one of the features is valued in a large
range compared to the other ones, the absence of normalization will
distort the Euclidean distance and make the other features meaning-
less (since they will play a too small part in the distance evaluation).
Normalization should also be done properly: for example, it is unfair
to normalize the whole x and then divide it into learning and testing,
since the normalization will have made use of data that is not supposed
to be available (the test data), to compute the normalization factors (i.e.,
mean and standard deviation).
• As mentioned before, in the best case, we want to have a large learning
set xl, a large validation set xv and a large test set xt. With mostDivide the data
carefully into
learning, validation
and test (see Fig. 12).
available data sets, it is just not possible to have all three, and we can
revert to using cross-validation and cross-test. A typical methodology
is thus to divide the original data set x (randomly permuted) into
xlv and xt (respectively of cardinals Nlv = |xlv| and Nt = |xt|), with
proportions to be decided. The xlv set is then divided into k folds, and
the cross-validation is performed (with normalization factors using
only the learning part). The model is finally tested on the remaining test
set xt which has been also normalized using the learning normalization
factors. Eventually, another random permutation of x is devised, and
the whole process is repeated, to have a more reliable estimate of the
test error. The main advantage of performing cross-test as described is
that it enables to have a good estimation of the generalization error of
the built model, meaning the error one would obtain were he to use
this specific model on data unseen until now.
Figure 12 illustrates the previously described approach to processing data
for a proper model training, validation and testing for the case of a 3-fold
cross-validation process. The cross-test is depicted by the loop on the h
parameter.
Now that the building of a model (for the supervised class of learning
problems) has been detailed, let us review some of the most used machine
learning models, in order to explicit some notations and important concepts
in machine learning.
4.3 some model classes for machine learning
In the following are presented six different model classes for machine learn-
ing. This review is very limited, but mainly wishes to present the algorithms
used for comparisons and benchmarks in some of the publications of this
dissertation (see publications A and E, for example). A whole class of models
is not presented in this chapter but in the next, the Random Projections
based models, since they are the foundation of the proposed new model, the
OP-ELM (chapter 5).
Random permutation
Full dataset
Test Error
Build
Validate on :{
Build
Validate on :{
Build
Validate on :{
3-fold  cross-validation
Build
Test Error
Random permutation
Learning set Test set
Figure 12: Proposed data processing scheme: a random permutation of the original
data set x is first divided into two parts x(h)lv for learning and validation
and x(h)t for the test. The set x
(h)
lv is then divided according to the k-fold
(here k = 3) cross-validation approach and the model M is first trained
with parameters Θj on xl1 (the (h) notation is dropped within the cross-
validation for simplicity). The trained model is validated on the validation
set xv1 to obtain the validation error εv1
￿
Θj
￿
. This process is repeated 3
times overall, for
￿
xl1 , xv1
￿
,
￿
xl2 , xv2
￿
and
￿
xl3 , xv3
￿
. And also repeated
for different values of the hyper-parameters Θj. The best set of parameters
Θ∗ = argminΘj εv
￿
Θj
￿
is then used to build the final model. It is used on
the test data x(h)t to determine the error ε
(h)
t . This procedure is repeated
h = H times to obtain the final cross-test value εt = 1H
￿H
h=1 ε
(h)
t .
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4.3.1 Linear discrimination and regression
The concept of linear regression/discrimination in machine learning is possi-
bly the simplest of all since it uses a linear model to regress/ classify the data.
Let us start by linear regression, and then present two models widely used
in steganalysis, the Linear Discriminant Analysis and the Support Vector
Machines.
Linear regression
Linear regression is
very simple, but
efficient on problems
with a linear
component.
In the regression learning problem case, the linear regression aims at finding
a matrix w such that, for the input x
yˆ = [1 x] ·w, (4.9)
where [1 x] denotes the matrix composed by the concatenation of a column
of ones in the first colum and x, to introduce a constant term (bias); the
Equation 4.9 is usually solved under the constraint of minimizing the Squared
Error between yˆ and the real output y
ε = ￿[1 x] ·w− y￿22 , (4.10)
where ￿·￿2 is the Euclidean norm. This solution, named Least Squares regres-
sion solution (also called Ordinary Least Squares solution (OLS)) is given by
w =
￿
[1 x]T · [1 x]
￿−1
[1 x]T · y. (4.11)
The classical
regression can also
use a regularization
parameter for
ill-conditioned cases.
In the case where the matrix x is ill-conditioned, the Ridge regression (or
Tikhonov regularization [126, 15]) can be used, which introduces a regular-
ization term in the Squared Error (training error)
εTikh = ￿[1 x] ·w− y￿22 + ￿T ·w￿22 . (4.12)
Usually, T is chosen to be αI, with I the identity matrix and α a scalar. From
Equation 4.12 it is clear that the larger is the regularization term, the larger
the training error will be, which reduces the risks of over-fitting.
This approach, although very simple and basic, usually deems decent
results, even compared with more elaborate models [103].
Linear Discriminant Analysis
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is widely used in the steganalysis field
([48, 87, 3]) for its good capacity at discriminating between two classes and
its rather low computational requirements.
In LDA, the data is projected onto a hyperplane w (to determine) and a
separating discriminant hyperplane is then found.
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LDAmakes the assumption that the probability density functions P (x|y = c1)
and P (x|y = c2) for the two classes c1 and c2 (we consider only a binary
classification problem) are normally distributed such that
P (x|y = c1) ∼ N(µ1,Σ1),
P (x|y = c2) ∼ N(µ2,Σ2),
(4.13)
with µj the mean and Σj the covariance for each of the classes (computed
from x). With the additional assumption that both covariance matrices Σ1 LDA uses
probabilistic
assumptions on the
distribution of the
classes.
and Σ2 are identical (homoscedasticity assumption) and full rank, we have
that the maximum separation between the two classes occurs for
w = Σ−1 (µ2 −µ1) , (4.14)
where w is the normal to the discriminant hyperplane.
In practice, x is first projected onto w and then the threshold T such that
x ·w < T — defining the position of the hyperplane orthogonal to w, and
hence the position of the actual discriminant — is optimized. The following
Support Vector Machine uses a similar idea of discriminating hyperplane but
uses kernels to make the data more separable, with no particular assumption
on the probability density function of the classes.
Support Vector Machine
The Support Vector Machine was originally proposed for the classification
problem in [19] (the earlier version of [129] does not use kernels, which are
contributing largely to the efficiency of the SVM), and was later extended to
regression problems [37].
In the following, we denote x = (x1, . . . , xN)T with xj ∈ RM the inputs
and similarly for y = (y1, . . . ,yN)T , yj ∈ R, the outputs.
The goal of SVM for classification (considering we use a kernel function K)
is to separate the two classes c1 and c2 in the so-called feature space defined
by the kernel K, using a hyperplane w. The use of a kernel is meant to make
the data x more separable in the feature space (induced by the kernel) than
it is in the original space. In this feature space, one tries to find the optimal SVM looks for the
best separating
hyperplane in the
induced kernel space.
hyperplane w to separate the two classes, which comes down to solving the
optimization problem
min
w,b,ξ
￿w￿22 +C
N￿
j=1
ξ2j
s.t.
yj
￿
wT ·ψ ￿xj￿+ b￿ ￿ 1− ξj, j ∈ ￿1,N￿
ξj ￿ 0, j ∈ ￿1,N￿
(4.15)
with K
￿
xj, xk
￿
= ψ
￿
xj
￿T
ψ (xk), C the complexity of the model and ξj
the slack variables which allow to solve the problem even if the two classes
are not fully separable in the induced kernel space. This specific case of the
SVM is called soft margin SVM classifier (due to the slack variables ξj) and the
formulation in Equation 4.15 assumes that the two classes are coded in y as
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+1 and −1. The parameter C controls the trade-off between the classification
error and the complexity of the model.
There are very efficient ways to solve this optimization problem, for ex-
ample the Sequential Minimization Optimization (SMO) algorithm [43], but
the fact remains that for the classification problem considered here, there
are already at least two hyper-parameters to select in this model: the hyper-
parameters for the kernel function K (usually a Gaussian one, with only the
width of the Gaussian σ to determine) and C. Using SVM for regression adds
an additional hyper-parameter to optimize, making the computational load
rather important for the learning of this model.
The Least-Squares Support Vector Machine [122] (LS-SVM) approach
makes the optimization problem a little simpler as Equation 4.15 is replaced
by a similar minimization problem, with an equality constraintLS-SVM has a
simpler formulation
than the standard
soft-margin SVM. min
w,b,e
￿w￿22 + γ
N￿
j=1
e2j
s.t. yj
￿
wTψ(xj) + b
￿
= 1− ej, j ∈ ￿1,N￿
(4.16)
which can be solved in a computationally more efficient way than the
previous one in Equation 4.15, in a Least Square sense. The ej are error
variables which allow for some misclassification as for the slack variables ξj
of the SVM.
Thanks to the use of a kernel, the discriminant hyperplane of the SVM
model is very efficient for many problems (see publication A, section III.B
for a comparison of SVM with other models on various classification and
regression data sets), but the computational time for the learning and valida-
tion usually suffers from the complexity and number of hyper-parameters of
it. Some of the proposed recent improvements both in the SMO algorithm
[75] and for approximating the hyperplane [22] could make the optimization
of the parameters faster.
4.3.2 Artificial Neural Networks
ANNs are built to
work similarly to
biological neural
networks.
The development of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) was inspired by
biological systems [63]. In this dissertation, we will limit ourselves to the case
of Single-Layer Feedforward Neural Network (SLFN) for simplicity. Since
ANNs can have a rather complicated structure (more than one hidden layer,
recurrence, feedback, . . . ), with many hyper-parameters to optimize, they are
often used in various applicative domains, such as air quality management
[125] and finance [135], for example.
A notable point is that the SLFN (one hidden layer, feedforward strucutre)
is an universal function approximator, meaning that given an error ￿ > 0, there
exists a set of hyper-parameters Θ for the SLFN such that
∀xj ∈ x,
￿￿SLFN ￿Θ, xj￿− f ￿xj￿￿￿ < ￿, (4.17)
with f being the function to approximate (continuous) [66, 63].
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Figure 13: Classical structure of a Single Hidden Layer Feedforward Neural Network.
Figure 13 illustrates the case of a SLFN, with the input layer being the
xj, the hidden layer containing a non-linear function K, and the output layer
calculated through a function φ, which we will consider as linear. We consider the
specific case of the
SLFN here.
Overall, the estimated output yˆv for sample xv in a SLFN with L neurons
is computed as
yˆv =
L￿
j=1
βjK
￿
wjxv + bj
￿
, (4.18)
with bj being the biases and provided that the output layer is composed of
a linear function φ (typical for regression and classification problems [123]).
A typical choice for the K function is that of hyperbolic tangent tanh,
tanh (x) =
e2x − 1
e2x + 1
. (4.19)
The parameters of this model are numerous: the output weights β =￿
β1, . . . ,βNl
￿T , the biases b = ￿b1, . . . ,bNl￿T and the input weights W =￿
w1, . . . ,wNl
￿T . The optimization problem resulting from the search of the
parameters can be solved in various ways of which the most notable ones
are probably back-propagation [63], Levenberg-Marquardt [14] or the scale
conjugate gradient approach [93]. SLFN (and ANN in
general) have many
parameters to
determine.
Given that the non-linear function K is determined, this class of model has
only one hyper-parameter: the number of neurons L to use.
A notable specific architecture of ANN is the Radial Basis Function Net-
work (RBFN) [105], which is a SLFN with a Radial Basis Function (RBF) as
the activation non-linear function K (Radial Basis Functions are a class of
functions such that K (x) = K (￿x￿), with ￿·￿ a norm). This specific structure
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can be trained in two parts : an unsupervised part, to determine the input
weights W and a linear supervised part, where the output weights β are
devised (no bias is considered in this model). Some heuristics and fast algo-
rithms can be used to determine all the parameters of the model efficiently
[12].
Again, one drawback to the efficiency of such models is the computational
time required to search for the optimal parameters (hoping that the searching
algorithm has not hit a local minima).
4.3.3 k-Nearest Neighbors
The k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) is one of the simplest possible models,
based on ranking of distances between samples.
In the case of binary classification, it consists in finding the set of k nearest
neighbors (k is odd)
xkNN (xv) = (xNN1 (xv) , . . . , xNNk (xv))T , (4.20)
for the point xv; that is, for the first neighbor xNN1,
xNN1 = minxj∈x
d
￿
xv, xj
￿
, (4.21)
where d (·, ·) is a distance (typically the Euclidean one). The following
nearest neighbors are found similarly. The estimated class for xv is then
obtained by a majority vote over the set of its k nearest neighbors xkNN (xv).k-NN is a
distance-based
technique, with
ranking of the points.
The approach is similar for the regression problem, except that an average
of the values of the nearest neighbors is used to predict the output yˆv,
yˆv =
1
k
k￿
j=1
yNNj, (4.22)
with yNNj the outputs corresponding to the nearest neighbors xNNj.
An advantage of the KNN is its simplicity: it only has one parameter to
optimize, being the number of neighbors k which is clearly bounded. Also,
although it relies on distances (and hence, can be subject to the problems
arising in high-dimensional spaces), it only uses them for ranking purposes,
which makes it a fast and reasonably efficient model in such spaces [13].
The Learning Vector Quantizationmodel (LVQ) [82] lies somewhere between
the k-NN approach and the ANN one. It uses so-called codebook vectors (whichLVQ uses prototypes
(codebooks) to cluster
and sort data.
are prototypes of a certain class or cluster of data) which are updated accord-
ing to their matching the class of the nearest neighbors (for a classification
problem): if the nearest neighbor of a codebook has the right class, then it is
likely that this codebook is in the proper “cluster” of points for this class and
should be driven toward the “center” of the cluster. If not, it should be driven
outward of the current cluster. Various update rules and extensions have
been proposed for the original LVQ algorithm, of which the Generalized LVQ
(GLVQ) [112], the Relevance LVQ (RLVQ) [17] and the one combining both
improvements, the Generalized Relevance LVQ (GRLVQ) [60, 61] are possibly
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the most used. A review of the state of the art can be found in [60], along
with references to most of the recent developments on LVQ. SOM also relies on
prototypes and
updates the array
nodes according to
the data.
Also, the Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) [81, 82] for regression problems
[85] are quite similar to the Vector Quantization (VQ) concept (original
unsupervised version of the LVQ), in the sense that the nodes of the array
of the SOM are updated in a similar fashion to that of the codebook vectors
of the VQ. The SOM provides, thanks to this nodes array structure, a two-
dimensional map of much higher dimensional data. Please refer to [82] for a
reference on the SOM.
Finally, a variant of the k-NN using a weighted sum in Equation 4.22 is
proposed in [135, 136]: the OP-KNN. The approach is similar to that of the
Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine (OP-ELM) presented in the
next chapter 5, section 5.3, with the use of k-NN “neurons”.
4.3.4 Gaussian Processes
The underlying idea in Gaussian Processes (GP) [108] is to make the assump-
tion that the output y can be modeled by a multivariate Gaussian distribution
(N-variate, in this case). Therefore, since “Gaussian processes generate data
located throughout some domain such that any finite subset of the range fol-
lows a multivariate Gaussian distribution” (from [108]), it becomes possible
to make y the result of a GP. In a rather general formulation, the output y is
considered to be the result of a function f applied on the input x plus some
zero-mean noise (as in Equation 4.2)
y = f (x) +N
￿
0,σ2I
￿
, (4.23)
where N
￿
0,σ2I
￿
denotes the zero-mean noise and f the underlying process
in data x. Now in the case of predicting the value yv for a point xv of x, the
covariance matrix K is first computed from the covariance function K
￿
xj, xk
￿
defined here as (classically a Radial Basis Function (RBF))
K
￿
xj, xk
￿
= σ20 exp
￿
−
1
2λ
￿￿xj − xk￿￿2￿ . (4.24)
Note that for this type of covariance function, there are two hyper-parameters
to optimize, λ and σ0, which can be optimized using Bayesian inference —
maximization of a marginal likelihood — if the required computations are
feasible (requires matrix inversions), or by cross-validation. A probabilistic
framework is also
used for the Gaussian
Processes.
The joint marginal likelihood is then
P (y,yv) = N
￿
0,KNl+v + σ
2I
￿
, (4.25)
with
KNl+v =
￿
KNl K
T
vNl
KvNl Kv
￿
, (4.26)
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and denoting
KNl =

K (x1, x1) · · · K
￿
x1, xNl
￿
...
. . .
...
K
￿
xNl , x1
￿ · · · K ￿xNl , xNl￿
 , (4.27)
KvNl =
￿
K (xv, x1) , . . . ,K
￿
xv, xNl
￿￿
and Kv = [K (xv, xv)]. From which
we can get the predicted output value yˆv as
yˆv = P (yv|y) = N (µv,Σv) , (4.28)
The prediction is
obtained from a
Gaussian distribution
with specific
parameters.
with
µv = KvNl
￿
KNl + σ
2I
￿−1
y
Σv = Kv −KvNl
￿
KNl + σ
2I
￿−1
KTvNl + σ
2I
. (4.29)
As can be seen from Equation 4.29 this requires matrix inversions, which
can be very costly when working with large number of samples. Overall, as
the experiments in publication A (section III.B) illustrate, the GP model is
very efficient (often the best performances for the benchmark in A, Table IV)
although costly, computationally speaking.
4.3.5 A global drawback
As we have noted in the description of these models, there are many hyper-
parameters (and parameters) to optimize (putting aside the LDA and the
linear regression). For models such as the ANN, where the overall direct
computations of the model are simple, the amount of parameters (internal
and hyper-) makes the learning and validation phase about as long as that
of models with less parameters but larger direct computational times (the
GP, for example).The problem of most
methods is the
computational time:
many parameters
(and
hyper-parameters) or
costly training.
The linear regression and LDA are outliers in this reasoning, for they
have virtually no hyper-parameters (the threshold for the LDA can be found
quickly and does not need to compute again the inverse of the covariance
matrix), given a relevant set of variables. Their learning and validation phase
are thus very fast, compared to other models, but in the end, they do not
give the best possible performance on non-linear problems.
In the end, there seems to be a tradeoff in choosing the model, between
the computational difficulty of it and the number of parameters and hyper-
parameters to optimize. One has to decide beforehand whether the model
should be trained very quickly — and have suboptimal performances in case
of non-linearity in the data — or if the training time does not matter as long
as the performances are here.
4.4 conclusion
TheMachine Learning field aims at learning from the data it is being presented.
In this dissertation, we consider the more specific case of supervised learning,
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in which the model is presented with the input data and an output — ob-
tained from a specific phenomenon — from which it can learn a relationship
between input and output, and hopefully predict the future behavior of the
underlying phenomenon.
The matter of training, validating and testing a model properly is a non-
trivial issue, as seen in this chapter. Obtaining the optimal set of hyper-
parameters for a chosen class of model requires many iterations, on a data set
pre-processed in order to avoid the problem of over-fitting, for example (see
Figure 12 for the proposed example of data processing and model training/
testing).
This procedure, while having the advantage of giving reliable estimates
for the validation and test error of a model on a data set, usually requires an
important computational time, especially for models having many hyper-
parameters.
In the following chapter 5, we present a class of models based on random
projections which have the advantage of being very fast and simple to train,
while keeping performances similar to that of state of the art algorithms.
We claim that this class of models offers a very good (if not the best) ratio
between performances and computational time and illustrate it throughout a
set of experiments.

5THE OPT IMALLY-PRUNED EXTREME LEARNING
MACHINE
In this chapter, we propose a new machine learning model (from publications
A and B) which intends to have a high performance/ speed ratio. We first
motivate more precisely this requirement of speed for machine learning
models, and then present the concept of random projections, which is used
in the proposed Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine (OP-ELM).
We finally detail the different steps of the OP-ELM model methodology and
provide a speed improvement originally described in publication B.
5.1 a need for speed (and efficiency)
As will be illustrated in more details in the next chapter 6, a large number
of features requires a large number of samples: in theory, the number of
samples grows exponentially with the number of features. If we consider
the current typical amount of features (in the order of hundreds) used for
steganalysis, the theoretical requirements concerning the number of samples
are simply unachievable. The best that can be done is to use as many samples
as possible, and estimate the reliability of the results, statistically. Data sets can be large
and models too slow
for them.
Taking the examples provided by Guang-Bin Huang on [67], the training
time (with a fixed set of hyper-parameters) for a data set consisting of 54
features and 100, 000 samples (the Forest Type prediction, a classification
problem) is of 694 minutes for a SVM — using the LIBSVM implementation
[25]. In the case of steganalysis, if using the DCT feature set from [99], we
have 194 features, which would probably lead to much larger computational
times, for the SVM (assuming the amount of samples is sufficient vis a vis
the dimensionality).
The bottom line is that models with multiple hyper-parameters or large
computational times are not practical when dealing with very large data sets.
Optimizing the parameters for some models is sometimes barely feasible
within days, let alone train many of them, for cross-validation or feature
selection for example. For the example of the SVM on the Forest data, running
a search for the hyper-parameters on a 20× 20 grid (each hyper-parameter is
tested on 20 different values) with such computational time is impossible.
The concept of feature selection and its importance are detailed more
widely in section 6.1, but in most cases, performing it requires multiple
trainings of the models, on different subsets of the whole feature set, to
evaluate the performance for a specific choice of features. This, combined
with the cross-validation and cross-test approaches makes the use of some
models totally impractical: it would take many weeks to perform feature
selection (whatever the scheme) on a set ofN = 10, 000 samples withM = 194
features using a classical SVM (even in classification, with only two hyper-
parameters).
In some cases, one could consider that “infinite” computational power
is available, and that the time required for the training of a model is an
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irrelevant issue. For the example of a government agency willing to perform
qualitative steganalysis, this can be a reasonable assumption: if the quality of
the model and the set of features have already been asserted, there is no need
to perform feature selection or cross-validation, and the only task remaining
is training the model with the right parameters (which might already be
known). In such a case, the learning time has indeed no relevance; once the
model is trained, it can be used ad libitum to detect steganography, without
any costs in computational time (or negligible one, the test phase always
being very fast).The infinite
computational power
assumption is
problematic.
One detail to remember, though, is that the determination of the set of
features (which will also be referred to as variables in the following) and of
the model class and parameters has to be done, at some point. While this
concern is eventually of minor importance to the government agency, it still
is a major issue to the researcher performing this search.
In the end, the computational time (related to the complexity of the model)
is a very important characteristic of a model, and should be taken into
consideration when performing classification or regression.
In the following, we first present a class of models related to random
projections, which offer a very good ratio performance/ speed, and then the
Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine, an improvement of a classical
method — the Extreme Learning Machine — which provides additional
robustness.
5.2 existing recent random projection based models
One reason for the concern about the speed of the models is that of the
number of features, as mentioned before. An obvious solution to this problem
is to reduce the dimensionality of the space before training the model.
Although the idea is simple, the realization is not: optimizing the whole
projection matrix P such that the projected data xP = P · x gives an optimal
result for the considered model M is computationally very expensive.
Random projections are a fast alternative to this. For the matter of project-The J-L theorem
states that a lower
dimensional space
can be found without
losing too much
information.
ing to a lower dimensional space, Johnson and Lindenstrauss in [72] have
shown that for a set of N points in M-dimensional space (considering the
distance measure as an Euclidean norm), there exists a linear transformation
of the data toward a Mf-dimensional space, with
Mf ￿ O
￿
￿−2 logN
￿
, (5.1)
which preserves the distances to a 1+￿ factor. The topology of the data might
also be preserved through this projection, such that the relevant information
is not “lost”. In [2], Achlioptas extends this result and proposes an algorithm
to devise a very simple projection matrix that preserves the distances to the
same factor than the J-L theorem mentions. This unfortunately comes at the
expense of a probability on the distance conservation.
More recently, Fradkin in [44] showed that simple random projections
obtained by one the methods proposed by Achlioptas in [2], deem decent
results on data sets obtained from the UCI Machine Learning repository [8],
yet behind the ones obtained using a simple Principal Component Analysis
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Figure 14: Illustration of the Reservoir Computing concept: a snapshot of the “pool”
of interconnected neurons (in the middle) is taken (noted s(k)) at step k
and the output layer Wout is devised from the state s(k).
(PCA) [96]. The article concludes by stating that random projections are an
interesting possibility if one is especially interested in obtaining results in a
short time frame, but remains a suboptimal approach.
In this dissertation, we focus mostly on two frameworks based on ran-
dom projections: the Reservoir Computing (RC) and the Extreme Learning
Machine (ELM) [92]. For a wider presentation of random projection based
models, one can refer to [130].
5.2.1 Reservoir Computing
The terminology Reservoir Computing (RC) — and the underlying framework
[131] — is proposed to unify a panel of models such as Liquid-State Machines
(LSM) [88] or Echo State Networks (ESN) [70, 71, 21], to name only these.
The concept behind the RC approach (which is similar to that of the ELM
presented below) is to randomly initialize a neural network (with recurrences
and feedback, here), and only “train” the output weights, that is, determine
them directly from the state of the network.
The training of the model is therefore very fast, since all the internal
weights are initialized randomly and do not need to be determined. Reservoir Computing
aims at time-varying
processes.
Reservoir Computing has been specifically meant for time-varying pro-
cesses and data. In this sense, let us denote by x(k) the input data x at
time step k and by y(k) the output data y at step k. The RC model uses a
multi-layer (no longer a SLFN) ANN with recurrence in the hidden layers,
and a possible feedback from the output. The inner layers of the ANN,
interconnected, are typically referred to as a pool of neurons.
Figure 14 depicts the global structure of the most general case of Reservoir.
Suppose we have the input data x(k) = (x1(k), . . . , xN(k))T and outputs
y(k) = (y1(k), . . . ,yN(k))T for time step k, the estimated output value yˆ(k+
1) for the next step input x(k+ 1) is then obtained by taking an image s(k) of
the pool of neurons, weighting it by the randomly initialized matrixW, added
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to the feedback from y(k) and the current weighted input fin
￿
Win · x(k+ 1)￿
as
yˆ(k+ 1) = fout
￿
Wout ·
￿
x(k+ 1), fin
￿
Win · x(k+ 1)
+W · s(k) +Wback · y(k)
￿
,y(k)
￿￿
,
(5.2)
with Wout,Win, W and Wback the output weight matrix, input weight
matrix, internal weight matrix and back-projection of output to internal net-
work weight matrix respectively (random), fin and fout the internal network
activation function (usually sigmoid) and readout function respectively and
finally s denoting the internal network state.It uses ANN with
recurrence and
feedback to model the
output.
With certain restrictions and specificities on some weight matrices and
functions, one can again find from this global definition, the ESN and LSM
models, for example. One can refer to [131] for more details on these models.
As it stands out from the definition of the Reservoir Computing approach,
this solution is especially meant for time-variant problems, and although it
can be applied to classical regression and classification problem, the following
Extreme Learning Machine is more straightforward to use in such a setup.
5.2.2 ELM based
The idea for the Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) by Guang-Bin Huang
[69] is in substance similar to that of the Reservoir Computing: since the
optimization of an ANN is very time-consuming, initialize the internal
weights of the network randomly and only “train” the output layer of the
network.ELM is similar to
RC: random
initialization and
output layer
determination.
The main difference in the ELM concept is that the ANN is a SLFN, that is,
there is no recurrence and only one hidden layer in the ANN. The structure
is thus the same as that presented in section 4.3.2, on Figure 13.
Using the same notations, we have the inputs x = (x1, . . . , xN)T , the
outputs y = (y1, . . . ,yN)T , the output layer β = (β1, . . . ,βN)T , a linear
output function φ, the input weight matrix W and the non-linear activation
function K; the estimated output yˆv is then obtained for point xv as
yˆv =
N￿
j=1
βjK
￿
wj · xv + bj
￿
. (5.3)
In the best possible case were yv = yˆv (the SLFN makes a perfect approxi-
mation) for all possible xv ∈ x, we can express the Equation 5.3 as the matrix
product
y = H ·β, (5.4)
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with
H =

K (w1 · x1 + b1) · · · K (wN · x1 + bN)
...
. . .
...
K (w1 · xN + b1) · · · K (wN · xN + bN)
 . (5.5)
Using these notations, Huang in [69] demonstrates the following theorem,
stating that given an activation function K infinitely differentiable, it is
possible to find the output weights β of the SLFN with random input
weights W such that it approximates as well as possible (ε > 0) the output y.
Theorem. Given any ε > 0 and an activation function K : R ￿→ R infinitely
differentiable in any interval, there exists n < N such that for N distinct samples
(xi,yi) , xi ∈ RM,yi ∈ R, for any weights wi ∈ RM and biases bi ∈ R,￿￿￿H[N×n]β[n×1] − y[N×1]￿￿￿ < ε.
The solution to Equation 5.4 in terms of Least Squares can then be obtained
by a Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse [107]. ELM is also an
universal
approximator.
It was later proved in [68] that the ELM, as the SLFN, is an universal
approximator of functions.
Recently, improvements to the original ELM have been proposed, such as
the Error Minimized Extreme Learning Machine (EM-ELM) [41]; it proposes
to add random neurons (one-by-one or group-by-group) to the original
ELM model once the training has been performed. The authors prove that
this EM-ELM actually converges. One of the most interesting points of this
development is in the fact that the computational time is minimal while
adding new random neurons to the ELM: the whole pseudo-inverse matrix
does not need to be recomputed, but weights only have to be updated using
fast update rules derived in the paper. It becomes not so important to have
a good (sufficient) number of neurons in the first training phase, since they
can anyway be added to the ELM without long computations afterwards.
The proposed Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning Machine (OP-ELM,
publications A and B) in the following section 5.3 uses a different approach
than that of the EM-ELM: instead of adding neurons to the original model
until the performances are satisfying enough, the idea is to take a large
number of them in the first place, and prune out the most irrelevant ones,
using a selection criterion.
5.3 op-elm
In this section, we present shortly the Optimally-Pruned Extreme Learning
Machine (OP-ELM) model. For more details and especially experiments and
benchmarks of this new method against state of the art ones (on publicly
available data sets from UCI repository [8]), please refer to the publications
included in this dissertation, A and B.
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Figure 15: Example of the perturbation of the ELM model by the use of an additional
irrelevant variable: ELM model is depicted in light dots, and the data itself
in dark crosses.
5.3.1 Some possible limitations of the ELM
The elaboration of this model started as the realization that the original ELM
model was sometimes behaving poorly on data sets containing irrelevant
variables: the simple addition of a feature containing pure Gaussian noise was
enough to perturbate the model and yield highly suboptimal performances.
A toy example from publication A (Figure 2) illustrates this clearly on a one-
dimensional example. Figure 15 is extracted from the original publication.ELM can be sensitive
to irrelevant data. The top plot on Figure 15 illustrates an ELM model trained on a sum of
sines, without any other variable. The fit is good. When adding a noise vari-
able to the data (not plotted for clarity), the ELM model on the bottom plot
becomes pertubated, although the variable does not contain any information.
It appears that the ELM needs a step of feature selection, in order to remove
such irrelevant variables. This can be performed by pruning the irrelevant
neurons of the hidden layer.
5.3.2 A methodology around ELM: OP-ELM
The OP-ELM can be described as a methodology surrounding ELM. It uses
three main steps which can be summarized as (see Figure 16):
1. Building a SLFN with a large number of neurons, using the ELM
approach (i.e., randomized weight matrix);
The OP-ELM is a
methodology around
ELM to address its
weaknesses.
2. Ranking the neurons by the use of the Multi-Response Sparse Regres-
sion algorithm, which provides an exact ranking of the neurons in this
case;
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Data SLFN constructionusing ELM
Ranking of best neurons
using MRSR
Selection of optimal
number of neurons
by LOO
Figure 16: The three steps of the OP-ELM methodology: construction of the SLFN
using ELM; ranking of best neurons using MRSR; use of LOO criterion to
decide how many neurons are kept.
3. Use a Leave-One-Out error estimation to choose how many of the
hidden neurons should remain in the final model.
The Multi-Response Sparse regression (MRSR) [117] is a computationally
efficient extension of the famous Least Angle Regression (LARS) [40] to
the multi-output case. The original LARS algorithm is a greedy variable
selection scheme which selects variables one by one (according to a Least
Squares criteria) and has the advantage of giving the best possible ranking of
variables, in the specific case where the problem considered is linear. This is Using MRSR to rank
neurons and LOO to
decide which ones to
keep.
the case in the OP-ELM architecture, since the output is a linear combination
of the hidden layer neurons. Hence, it provides the best possible ranking of
the hidden neurons and makes the last step of thresholding easier.
In the third step, the performance of the SLFN with an increasing number
of neurons (previously ranked) is devised, using a LOO error criterion. Again,
since the problem is linear in this part of the SLFN, it is possible to use a fast
estimation of the LOO error thanks to a closed form formula [94, 18]. The
final structure of the OP-ELM is then obtained.
It should be noted also that the OP-ELM proposes to use also linear
kernels, in addition to the classical Gaussian and sigmoid ones proposed in
the original ELM.
In the end, the OP-ELM can be seen as a projection into a high dimensional
space (hidden layer of the SLFN), followed by a linear model (output layer of
the SLFN) on which variable selection is performed, by the MRSR. Variable
selection techniques are detailed more widely in section 6.1.
Some of the results presented in publication A (Tables II, III, IV and
V, especially) are reproduced here: Tables 3 and 5 (left) give the average
computational times performed by five state of the art machine learning
algorithms while Tables 4 and 5 (right) give the Mean Square Error and
accuracy obtained on regression and classification data sets, respectively.
Results are the average of ten bootstrap rounds, as detailed in publication A
(section III.B).
In addition to the results of publication A, the OP-ELM and the SVM
are compared here over two classical steganalysis problems: a regression
one over the estimation of the embedding rate (initially between 0 and
30%, in the R(1) sense, see 2.3.2) and a classification one. The images used
for this experiment are the whole 10000 from the BOWS2 [10] database,
with two thirds used for training and one third for testing, using the same
bootstrapping approach as in publication A. Proportions of half stego and
half cover have been respected for the classification problem. Features used
for both problems are the extended DCT features from [99].
Abalone Elevators Servo Bank Stocks Boston Steg.
SVM 6.6e+4 5.8e+2 1.3e+2 1.6e+3 2.3e+3 8.5e+2 1.7e+5
MLP 2.1e+3 3.5e+3 5.2e+2 2.7e+3 1.2e+3 8.2e+2
GP 9.5e+2 6.5e+3 2.2 1.7e+3 4.1e+1 8.5
OP-ELM 5.7 29.8 2.1e-1 8.03 1.54 7.0e-1 2.4e+2
ELM 4.0e-1 1.6 3.9e-2 4.7e-1 1.1e-1 7.4e-2
Table 3: Computational times (in seconds) for all five algorithms on regression data
sets. Results are the average of ten bootstraps repetitions.
Abalone Elevators Servo Bank Stocks Boston Steg.
SVM 4.5 6.2e-6 6.9e-1 2.7e-2 5.1e-1 3.4e+1 2.5e-4
2.7e-1 6.8e-7 3.3e-1 8.0e-4 9.0e-2 3.1e+1 1.0e-5
MLP 4.6 2.6e-6 2.2e-1 9.1e-4 8.8e-1 2.2e+1
5.8e-1 9.0e-8 8.1e-2 4.2e-5 2.1e-1 8.8
GP 4.5 2.0e-6 4.8e-1 8.7e-4 4.4e-1 1.1e+1
2.4e-1 5.0e-8 3.5e-1 5.1e-5 5.0e-2 3.5
OP-ELM 4.9 2.0e-6 8.0e-1 1.1e-3 9.8e-1 1.9e+1 1.6e-4
6.6e-1 5.4e-8 3.3e-1 1.0e-6 1.1e-1 2.9 1.4e-5
ELM 8.3 2.2e-6 7.1 6.7e-3 3.4e+1 1.2e+2
7.5e-1 7.0e-8 P5.5 7.0e-4 9.35 2.1e+1
Table 4: Average Mean Square Error in bold (standard deviation in plain) for all five
algorithms for regression data sets. Results are the average of ten bootstraps
repetitions.
Iris Wine Stegano
SVM 95.4 95.8 89.7
1.9 2.9 0.95
MLP 94.8 96.0
3.8 2.4
GP 95.6 96.1
2.3 2.1
OP-ELM 95.0 90.7 90.1
2.1 4.9 1.03
ELM 72.2 81.8
1.01 6.2
Iris Wine Stegano
SVM 2.3e+2 3.8e+2 8.9e+5
MLP 7.6e+2 1.2e+3
GP 7.6e-1 1.9
OP-ELM 7.4e-2 4.4e-1 2.6e+2
ELM 2.4e-2 2.7e-2
Table 5: Accuracy (in percent) in boldface (standard deviation in plain) for all five
algorithms for classification data sets (left) and associated computational
times (in seconds, right). Results are the average of ten bootstraps repetitions.
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It can be seen that although the ELM is about one order of magnitude faster
than the OP-ELM, its performances can be unstable and are almost always
outperformed by the OP-ELM (both in terms of standard deviation of the
results and accuracy/Mean square error). Compared to the other machine
learning algorithms used here, the OP-ELM is a very good compromise
between speed and accuracy: it remains in the range of performance of the
other state of the art methods such as GP or SVM, but is several orders of
magnitude faster than them.
One potential issue — realized recently — with the use of the PRESS
Leave-One-Out criterion lies in the matrix computations performed which
require matrix inversions. If the LOO error is not performed properly because
of numerical instabilities (some data sets have shown such instabilities, even
if minor), the following pruning by the MRSR is most likely suboptimal. An
improvement of the OP-ELM would for example lie in the use of another
criterion than the LOO for selecting the model complexity, or to solve the
potential numerical problems of the LOO.
The following section introduces a different complexity selection criterion
than the Leave-One-Out, for increased speed of the model training.
5.3.3 A possibly faster version: HQ criterion
In the OP-ELM, the model complexity is decided by the results from the
Leave-One-Out criterion: if the LOO error starts to increase while adding
more neurons (in the order for which they have been ranked by the MRSR),
the remaining neurons are dropped and only the ones kept until then are
retained for the final model architecture.
While the LOO can be expressed in a closed form for this specific case,
it remains that the formula requires matrix inversions (see publication B
(section 2) for more details), which are still costly.
In B, we propose to replace the LOO criterion of the OP-ELM by an
information criterion, the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) one [62]. The HQ criterion can
increase the
computational speed.
The choice of the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion over some more classical
information criteria such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [113]
or Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) [4] was mostly done experimentally
(such experiments are not present in the original publication B).
Over several data sets from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [8]
it was deemed that the penalty term 2k log logN (with k the number of
parameters of the model and N the number of samples) grows much more
slowly, thanks to the double log, than its counterpart for the BIC and AIC, as
in Equation 5.6, below.
HQ = N× log (εMSE) + 2k× log logN
BIC = N× log (εMSE) + k× logN
AIC = N× log (N× εMSE) + 2k
(5.6)
From the benchmarking experiments conducted in publication B (section
4), this choice enables to divide the computational time (compared to the
LOO-based OP-ELM) by four to five folds on the tested data sets (regression
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problems, from UCI also [8]). The gain in speed for another model of a
similar kind, the OP-KNN [136], is even greater (up to 24 fold).
It can be noted, though, that for the OP-ELM case the number of selected
neurons is globally increased, when using this information criterion instead
of the LOO one. While the LOO one has potential numerical instabilities
issues, it still yields a more compact model in terms of neurons. The need
for speed has to be evaluated before choosing one criterion or the other, if
one cares about the number of neurons selected.
5.4 conclusion
The double problem of large data set in steganalysis and important training
time for the model is addressed in this chapter, by the use of a random
projection based model, theOP-ELM. Using a Single Layer Feedforward Network
(SLFN) with random weights in the first layer, and linear output layer,
it is possible to obtain an universal function approximator (under some
assumptions). This is known as the Extreme Learning Machine (ELM). The
OP-ELM is based on this structure and adds a neuron selection step based
on the MRSR ranking algorithm, which is used to rank the relevance of the
neurons in the SLFN, according to a Leave-One-Out criterion.
We proposed finally the use of a different criterion for the neurons ranking:
the Hannan-Quinn criterion, with the advantage of a three to four fold speed
increase over the whole OP-ELM methodology.
The next two chapters present the results obtained for two specific stega-
nalysis problems, using the presented OP-ELM for the methodologies and
experiments.
Part III
US ING MACHINE LEARNING FOR
STEGANALYS I S PROBLEMS

6A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO BENCHMARKING
STEGANOGRAPHIC SCHEMES
Here we propose to address the methodologies and experiments from publi-
cations C, D and E, specifically. We start by motivating the need for feature
selection, based on some well-established facts about the Curse of Dimensional-
ity, followed by a refinement of these problems in the steganalysis framework.
The three different classes of features selection schemes — filtering, wrapper
and embedded methods — are shortly described and the global methodology
presented through publications C, D and E is described in two major steps.
Please note that a majority of the results is kept in the publications, and only
an introduction to these results and to some of the conclusions from the
publications, are given here. Hence, the reader is refered to C, D and E for
more details.
6.1 why is feature selection so important ?
We have presented in the previous chapter 4, in section 5.2 the possibility of
using random projections to reduce the dimensionality of the input space. As
stated, there is currently no algorithm capable of reducing the dimensionality
in a very short time frame, for non-linear problems, without losing some
information about the data in the process. The optimization of the projec-
tion matrix P regarding the validation criterion is a highly time-consuming
process, when the problem has a large number of variables. Feature selection can
improve
performances, reduce
dimensionality and
increase
interpretability.
A different approach to that of the projection is the feature selection (which
can be considered as a special case of projection). Denoting the data matrix
x by columns instead of the usual rows notation, x =
￿
xT1 , . . . , x
T
M
￿
with
xTj ∈ RN, a feature selection process finds a subset FSsub of the original
full set of features FS = {1, . . . ,M} such that |FSsub| < |FS| and that the error
criterion is satisfied.
The search for a subset of features can have three different goals:
1. Improve the performances: obtain a subset FSsub of features of FS such
that the performances are better using FSsub than FS;
2. Reduce the dimensionality while keeping similar performances: obtain
a subset FSsub of features of FS such that the performances using
FSsub are within a certain range of the ones using FS;
3. Interpretability: in the case where the features have a physical — or
interpretable — meaning, find a ranking of the features which high-
lights their importance regarding the problem at stake. The order in
which the features are ranked gives hints about the structure of the
underlying problem.
The only main difference between the first two goals is about the number of
features to finally select: the first approach will be more aggressive in terms of
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performances at the expense of a subset possibly still of high dimensionality;
the second approach is more oriented toward the dimensionality reduction
while performances are only a constraint. The third one can be combined
with the first two goals, and used as an additional step once the primary
performance or dimensionality goal has been achieved.
Using the same notations as in chapter 4, a typical requirement on the
error criterion for the second approach is that the difference between the
error
εFSsub = frisk (M (Θ, x (FSsub)) ,y) , (6.1)
of the model using the reduced set of features FSsub and the one using theCriterion can be
devised depending on
the goal of feature
selection.
original set of features εFS (defined in the same way), is less than a certain
threshold T
εFSsub − εFS < T . (6.2)
This criterion is merely an example and is restrictive to the case of variable
subset selection, as detailed in 6.1.3.
The criterion for the second approach is more oriented toward perfor-
mances and can be expressed as find a subset FSsub of FS such that
εFSsub < εFS. (6.3)
With these notations, let us describe some of the problems that arise due
to the high-dimensionality of the space (large number of features), in general
first, and for the specific case of the steganalysis setup afterwards.
6.1.1 Issues in high-dimensional spaces
Although the set of problems caused by high-dimensional spaces is usually
designated by the terminology Curse of Dimensionality, the original meaning
intended by Bellman in [11] was about the exponential increase of the number
of function evaluations with the dimensionality: optimizing a function of M
binary variables with an exhaustive search over the input data requires 2M
function evaluations.
In the following, we will review three typical issues related to the high
dimensionality of a problem. For a more thorough review of the Curse of
dimensionality and more generally high dimensional data analysis, one can
refer to [45] for example.
A “need” for samples
The need for samples and the empty space phenomenon are two sides of the same
problem, related to the lack of samples to fill sufficiently the space.In high dimensional
space, there are never
enough samples.
Consider a M-dimensional space (M variables) with a Cartesian grid of
step ￿ defined in it. If one wants to have at least a sample in each “sub-cube”
of side ￿ of the whole grid, the amount of samples required is of the order of
O
￿
(1/￿)M
￿
, which grows exponentially fast withM. Therefore, in aM = 10
dimensional space, with a step ￿ = 1/10, one already needs 1010 samples to
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Figure 17: Illustration of the concentration of distances effect for a set of uniformly dis-
tributed samples: histogram of the pairwise distances between uniformly
drawn samples, in dimension 2 (left) and 100 (right).
fill correctly the whole space, which is impossible to handle at the moment
(both in terms of storage and processing).
The empty space phenomenon describes the same problem, from the
opposite point of view: suppose we already have N samples in the M-
dimensional space. Using the same grid to define a hypercube that spans
the whole space, there will be a certain amount of samples in each sub-cube.
With the increase of M (and keeping the same N), most of the sub-cubes will
end up empty. Not enough samples
means a learning
space not filled and
thus a model which
will extrapolate.
One might wonder, though, why the space need be filled with samples
uniformly, as in the cases of the grid described. If a model M is trained on
samples which do not span correctly the whole space in which it is supposed
to be able to provide estimations, it might extrapolate for test points that
lie outside of its “learning space”. The correct behavior for a model is to
interpolate, on new data, and extrapolation might be hazardous, regarding
the quality of the estimation.
In practice, as shown in publications D (section 4.1) and E (section 4.2.1),
the requirements on a sufficient number of samples (regarding statistically
relevant results) are very much below the theoretical expectations, fortunately.
The concentration of distances
As seen in the previous part of this dissertation, some models are based on
distances between samples, the k Nearest Neighbors, for example.
A problem in such spaces is that distances concentrate: the range of possible
distances is not fully spanned anymore, and most of the samples are at large
distances from each other. Figure 17 illustrates this situation for a set of
points drawn from a uniform distribution, in a two-dimensional space on the
left and 100-dimensional space on the right. For the two-dimensional case,
distances exist in the whole possible range
￿
0,
√
2
￿
, while in dimension 100,
only a very small part of the histogram is filled, mostly with large distances. Distances tend to be
all similar and large.The bottomline of these two problems (empty space and distance concen-
tration) is that there are never enough points in high-dimensional spaces,
and they all tend to be far away from each other, rendering the relevance of
distance-based models questionable [13].
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Complexity of models
We have seen that models can suffer from irrelevant (or not relevant enough)
variables, as in the case of the ELM, for example. Although it is often claimed
that the SVM is not so sensitive to high-dimensional spaces and irrelevant
variables, it is shown practically in [134] that on the contrary, SVM as most
other models benefits from a most relevant set of variables.
Once truly irrelevant variables have been pruned out, going further into
feature selection becomes a matter of performance or computational speed.The model complexity
is always related to
the dimensionality
(directly or not).
Indeed, all machine learning have a complexity either related to the di-
mensionality M or to the number of samples N (sometimes both), linear
in the best cases, and most of the time at least quadratic with one of them.
Therefore, lowering the number of variables helps in reducing the amount of
samples required to fill the space and thus the computational time for the
model training (and validation).
6.1.2 More specifically: for steganalysis problems
In the steganalysis framework, the need for samples can be adressed rather
easily (compared to some specific fields where acquiring an additional sample
has important costs), even though the storage of the images can become a
problem for a very large base. Also, the computational and data processing
time issues — since one has to extract the features from each image — are
not negligible and both are in favour of dimensionality reduction.The possibility of
interpreting the
variables in
steganalysis
motivates the feature
selection.
More specific to steganalysis is the interpretability of the variables selected:
if a certain variable is retained in the dimensionality reduction process, then it
must relate specifically to the output; for the case of qualitative steganalysis
for example, it means that this variable enables to have a more reliable
detection of the stego image over the cover one. Which implies that the stego
algorithm alters the cover image in the meaning related to this variable.
This leaves room for interpretation and possibly securing the stego al-
gorithm, if it is known. If not known, it makes possible a sort of “reverse-
engineering” on the stego algorithm, highlighting some of its weaknesses
and therefore revealing partially its functioning.
Also, steganalysis is about performances. Whether it is in regression or
classification, the goal is usually to perform as best as possible. In this sense,
and even with the best possible set of features, an insufficient amount of
samples might cripple the model and lead to suboptimal performances; or
on the contrary, surprisingly (unreliable) good performances if the model
is not validated and tested as described for example in 4.2: the variance of
the results might be very large and make the results statistically insignificant.
Publication E (see e.g., Figure 5) addresses this issue practically.
6.1.3 Performing feature selection
On the general level, it is possible to identify three main classes of feature
selection: wrapper, filter and embedded methods. In the following, we give a
few example of feature selection schemes belonging to each class, with an
emphasis on wrapper methods, since it is the class used in the publications
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included in this dissertation. A more detailed review of feature selection
techniques for machine learning can be found for example in [59].
Filtering
Filtering methods can be seen as a pre-processing step on the data x. In this
class, no model is considered, but a scoring function SF
￿
xTj ,y
￿
is typically
used: the score computed between the variable j of the data set x and the
output y permits to decide whether this variable j should be retained. Thus, Filtering methods use
each variable
separately in relation
to the output.
variables are considered separately and one at a time, in this method. One
of the main advantages over wrapper and embedded schemes is the low
computational time it requires (for M variables, only M evaluations of the
scoring function SF have to be computed). Examples of scoring functions
include Pearson’s correlation coefficient (used for example in [102]) and
mutual information, among others [59]. While Pearson’s coefficient is easy to
compute, it only reveals linear dependencies between the considered variable
and the output. Mutual information suffers from the difficulty we have to
estimate it practically.
The following wrapper and embedded schemes do not consider each
variable separately regarding the output, but by subsets or sequential adding/
removing.
Wrapper and embedded methods
These classes of feature selection techniques require the use of a model.
Instead of the previous scoring function, the model is here used to verify the
relevance of the selected subset of variables. One advantage of these methods
lies in the fact that various combinations of variables can be considered,
regarding the output, and not only one, as in the filtering approach. Embedded methods
are a bit specific:
selection is inside the
model.
The embedded methods are using a process of feature selection inside the
machine learning model itself. Decision trees are an instance of this type of
methods [20].
The wrapper methods are popular since they allow the use of any model
as the decision criterion on whether a variable should be kept or not: in this
scheme, the machine learning model acts as a black box. Let us cite two greedy
methods as wrappers: the forward selection and the backward elimination. The
adjective greedy comes from the fact that once a variable as been added/
removed, it is never considered again. The forward and backward methods
are actually variable ranking methods: the selection of the subset remains a
decision of the user in the end. Wrapper methods
such as the forward
are often used for
they are easy to
implement and can
use any model.
The forward selection starts with an empty set of selected variables S and
a full set of remaining variables R. Each of the variables in R is added in turn
to S, and performance is evaluated for each set S containing one variable. The
variable deeming the best results is put in S definitely and removed from R.
The algorithm iterates M(M− 1)/2 times (with M the number of variables),
considering sets of the first selected variable and one of the remaining in
R, and finishes once R is empty. The algorithm is put in a more formal
algorithmic way in publication E (section 3.3.1), for example.
The backward elimination works in the same way, except that the initial set
of selected variables is full and the remaining one is empty. The algorithm
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processes this time by eliminating the variable contributing the less to the
performance, until none is left.
At the end, one obtains a ranking of the variables, which enables to select
a sufficient amount of variables regarding the performances of the model.
The forward selection is used in the following description of a practical
benchmarking for stego algorithms, to select the steganalysis features that
are most relevant.
6.2 practical benchmarking of stego algorithms
Chronologically, publication C is the first one to propose the use of feature
selection for steganalysis problems. The set of features used is the original
23 DCT features set of Fridrich [46], and the paper shows through a method-
ology using the forward selection scheme, that it is possible for the stego
algorithms Outguess, F5 and Steghide, to reduce the set of 23 features to
a subset of 13 (different for each stego algorithm) while retaining similar
performances. This early work gave the basis for the methodology that is to
be presented quickly in the following, and published in E.A possible practical
benchmark for
steganography: find
how many images
should be used and
perform feature
selection.
One problem which arose while experimenting was that of the relation
between the number of samples (images here) and the reliability of the
results. We realized when using a larger feature set, that results were no
longer statistically stable, with large deviations on different permutations of
the data set.
Publication D deals mainly with this problem, when using the extended
version of the DCT feature set, containing 193 features. Using a similar
methodology to that of C, the variance of the results is estimated when the
number of samples varies.
Finally, a global critique on the methodology used until then was on the
use of a different machine learning model for the variable selection (a k-NN)
and for the final evaluation of the performances (a SVM). It was argued that
variables selected using one machine learning method might not be the most
appropriate for another model, and hence, that the selection of variables was
possibly sub-optimal for a SVM.
It should be noted that in all three publications, the terminology “con-
fidence interval” is used to designate the interval based on the standard
deviation of the results around the computed mean value.
Even though the forward selection approach has a rather limited number
of iterations (compared to an exhaustive search, for example) it remains
computationally intractable to perform it on a large data set using the SVM.
In this regard, the OP-ELM was proposed and used, in E, to obtain a global
practical benchmark for stego algorithms. The following presents shortly the
two main parts of this benchmark approach, and the reader is refered to
the original publications C, D and E for the full set of results and a wider
analysis.
6.2.1 Determining a sufficient number of points
As described at more length in publication E, the determination of a sufficient
number of points is using a bootstrap approach [39] to obtain statistically
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Figure 18: Standard deviation in percentage of the average classification result (rela-
tive variation) versus the number of images used, for the four embedding
rates for the Outguess algorithm: black circles (￿) for 20%, green squares
(￿) for 15%, red crosses (×) for 10%, and blue triangles (￿) for 5%. Please
that the embedding rates are measured here using the R(2) definition from
section 2.3.2.
relevant results for varying sizes of the subset drawn randomly from the
original data set. The 100 runs of the bootstrap over large data sets are
feasible, computationally speaking, with the OP-ELM as the machine learning
model. Again, the reader is refered to publication E for more details on the
methodology. First find how many
images are required
for the task. . .
As a mere illustration of the effect of the size of the data set over the
relevance of the results, let us take the example of the Outguess stego
algorithm, for the following. Publication E gives results for five other stego
algorithms: F5, MM3, JPHS, MBSteg and Steghide.
Figure 18 plots the standard deviation of the results (in percentage of
the average accuracy) versus the number of samples used (images), for the
OP-ELM model on a boostrap with 100 repetitions. Note that the embedding
rates are computed as in the R(2) definition from section 2.3.2. Two main
points can be made:
1. the larger is the embedding rate, the lower is the standard deviation
of the results: a large embedding rate yields more statistically stable
results;
2. the more images are used to train the model and perform the stegana-
lysis, the more relevant are the results (statistically speaking).
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Figure 19: Accuracy versus number of features used, for the four embedding rates for
the Outguess algorithms: black circles (￿) for 20%, green squares (￿) for
15%, red crosses (×) for 10%, and blue triangles (￿) for 5%. Not all points
are plotted for clarity.
The plots for all six stego algorithms behave in a similar way to that for the
Outguess one.
In publication E, a sufficient number of images is chosen based on a
threshold arbitrarily set on the relative standard deviation of the results. The
1% figure was deemed sufficient for the rest of the methodology, but could
be taken to be any other non-zero value, if the steganalysis system is reliable.
This is basically a user-defined value, depending on the desired maximum
variance of the results.
The outcome of this step is a number of images sufficient to obtain statisti-
cally relevant results, number which is used in the rest of the experiments
regarding the feature selection.
6.2.2 Determining a sufficient number of features
The second step of the methodology is to determine a sufficient number of
features for each stego algorithm. Again, let us overview the results for the
Outguess algorithm.And then select the
features and interpret
the selection.
In Figure 19, it can be seen that for this specific stego algorithm, only
a fraction (less than 50 seems enough) of the full 193 DCT feature set is
sufficient to obtain a good accuracy, similar to the best possible result, within
the noise of the results. This means that the dimensionality of the data set
can be reduced by at least a factor four, for the Outguess.
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The decision over the number of features to keep is again a user-defined
tradeoff between accuracy and desired number of features. To be precise,
it could be defined by taking the numerical derivative of the accuracy plot
(versus number of features), and a threshold (user-defined) on this derivative
would give the number of features beyond which the accuracy increase is
not important enough anymore.
This conclusion for the Outguess cannot be generalized to the other stego
algorithms, as noted in publication E: even though the shape of the plot is
similar, the size of the feature set required can be very different (and vary
largely between the embedding rates, interestingly).
Also, the selected features are different, for each stego algorithm, which
enables the previously mentioned analysis on the possible weaknesses of the
algorithm.
We refer the reader to the publication for more details on this study, along
with a list of the selected variables and their importance.
6.3 conclusion
Feature selection (or variable selection) is an important concept in machine
learning. Even in the hypothetical case where infinite amount of samples, in-
finite computational power and perfect models would exist, feature selection
would not be useless. Not only does it provide lower dimensional spaces
making the task easier in terms of model and amount of samples required,
but it also gives interpretability to the selected features. This reveals addi-
tional information about the problem and the phenomenon underlying in the
data. In the specific case of steganalysis, and given that the features used can
be interpreted in a practical sense, the selected features give practical insight
over the stego algorithm used and some of its weaknesses (preservation of
the AC histograms, for example).
Throughout publications C, D and E, we have developed a methodol-
ogy to address the problems of high-dimensional spaces in the steganalysis
framework: first, making sure that the amount of samples to perform any
experiment is sufficient regarding the number of features used (dimensional-
ity of the space); second, determining a sufficient number of features for a
particular problem, enabling a deeper analysis of the selected features for a
possible reverse-engineering of the stego scheme used.
The problem of the sufficient number of images regarding the accuracy
of the results is especially important for low embedding rates and for some
algorithms; for example MBSteg with a 5% embedding rate yields up to
7% of relative standard deviation of the average result. Too frequently, the
amount of samples sufficient for a proper model training is overlooked and
the results presented tend to have high variance, and are hence unreliable.
Again, the presentation of these steps is described shortly here to intro-
duce the publications and the results. More details are available from the
publications in this dissertation (C, D and E for this specific chapter).
While this chapter is mostly focused on classification problems (qualitative
steganalysis), the following proposes to address the quantitative steganalysis
case, with a novel practical approach on the matter.

7A NOVEL APPROACH TO QUANTITAT IVE
STEGANALYS I S AND IMAGE REL IAB IL ITY
EST IMATION
This chapter aims at presenting the recent novel results from publication F
about the quantitative steganalysis problem. The methodology and approach
presented in publication F are the first steps in this direction for quantitative
steganalysis and image reliability estimation, presented for one stego algo-
rithm (nsF5). As for the previous chapter, the concepts from publication F
are described here, along with some results and possible clarifications. The
reader is invited to refer to publication F for the full details and experiments
on this new approach to quantitative steganalysis.
7.1 re-embedding concept for quantitative steganalysis
In the following — and in publication F — we place ourselves in a specific
case of quantitative steganalysis, with certain assumptions: Assumptions for the
re-embedding
concept.• we know the stego algorithm used by the sender (this can be identified
by blind steganalysis, for example);
• we have a model M that can predict accurately the embedding rate (we
use the R(1) definition,here; see section 2.3.2);
• the message embedded by the sender does not span the whole capacity
of the image. This is a reasonable assumption if the sender does not
want to be too easily caught.
In this setup of quantitative steganalysis, we want to know how large is the
message (quantitative steganalysis setup) that has been embedded by the
sender in a suspicious image i. The direct use of a feature set — for example
the full calibrated DCT one, see section 3.3.4 — on the image i with the
model M should give proper results in quantitative steganalysis, as in [103]
with an OLS for the model. We try to improve the quality of the results, and
also find additional information — the number of embedding changes and
the number of original non-zero AC coefficients — by interpolation using
the re-embedding concept. Re-embedding adds
an additional message
in a suspicious image.
In order to both improve the estimation of the original embedding rate
and give a confidence interval of this estimation, we use a re-embedding
technique. The idea is here depicted for one single image i (experiments in
publication F are performed on 700 images from the BOWS2 database [10]),
for simplicity of notations. The 193 calibrated DCT features from [99] are
used.
Suppose we have intercepted the image io coming from a suspicious
sender and we want to estimate the number of embedding changes Eo made
to that image (in relation with the definition of the embedding rate R(1)). For
this, we make in a copy ij of image io, and perform Ej embedding changes
on it (Ej being uniformly drawn in a certain range).
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This process of re-embedding is repeated N times, giving a set of im-
ages
￿
ij, 1 ￿ j ￿ N
￿
, containing the original embedding changes and the
additional ones.We approximate the
final embedding rate
Rj as in Eq. 7.1.
We propose to approximate the embedding rate Rj for the re-embedded
images ij (in the same sense as for the definition of R(1)) as
Rj =
Eo + Ej
Ao
= Ro +
1
Ao
Ej, (7.1)
where Ao is the number of non-zero AC coefficients in the original image
(before a message was embedded and it became io). This approximation is
shown to be sensible in publication F, under the assumptions mentioned
previously — careful steganographer, i.e. embedding rate rather small. The
idea is then to have many Ej to be able to estimate the constant term Ro and
the first order coefficient 1Ao from a set of equations as Equation 7.1.
Indeed, using the model M which is supposed to be able to estimate
embedding rates of the R(1) form, we can estimate the Rj from the ij and
obtain the Rˆj such that
Rˆj = Ro +
1
Ao
Ej + εj, (7.2)
with εj the error made by M for image ij. The approximation made in
Equation 7.1 regarding the total embedding rate is investigated in publication
F (see e.g. Figure 3) and proved to be reasonable for low Eo + Ej.The approximation is
reasonable for low
Eo+Ej, see
publication F.
By using this approach, we aim at obtaining a better estimation of the
original embedding rate, as well as a confidence interval on that value
indicating how reliable is the estimation.
7.2 embedding rate and confidence interval estimation
Using a set of N equations (each equation coming from one re-embedding),
the linear system
Ro +
1
Ao
E = Rˆ (7.3)
is obtained, in which E is the vector of all the Ej and Rˆ is the vector of all
the Rj. As described at more length in publication F, the constant coefficientMultiple repetitions
of the re-embedding
allow for the
embedding rate
estimation by linear
regression.
found from the solution of the system (solved in a Least-Squares sense) is the
estimation of the original embedding rate used by the sender and the first
order coefficient is the estimation of the inverse of the number of non-zero
AC coefficients. From these two, it is possible to obtain the estimation of the
number of original embedding changes Eo.
In addition, it is possible to compute a confidence interval on the estimated
values for Ro and 1Ao (the value Ao permits the calculation of the original
number of embedding changes, from Ro). In publication F, it is done using
the Matlab® function regress, which uses a Student’s t score, as described
in [36].
Figure 20 illustrates the idea (figure from publication F) for the image set
used in the publication. The value at the ordinate for abscissa zero gives
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Figure 20: Estimated embedding rate Rˆj versus number of re-embedding changes Ej.
The slope of the linear regression gives the first order term 1Ao while the
ordinate when Ej −→ 0 gives the constant term Ro.
the estimate of the original embedding rate Ro, while the slope of the linear
regression gives 1Ao . The confidence interval on both values is also computed
for that specific image io.
The width of this confidence interval is then used to obtain an estimation
of the image difficulty and thus of the reliability of the estimate.
7.3 inner image difficulty/ reliability estimation
An original work of Böhme and Ker on quantitative steganalysis [16] ana-
lyzed a quantity similar to that of the inner image difficulty discussed here
and in publication F, the within-image error. By defining a two error model of
the estimation of the payload size, the authors analyze the within-image error
which takes into account the errors caused by the possible dependencies
between the cover image and the message embedded in it. We propose a
similar idea to measure the inner difficulty of the image and show that it can
be estimated for a stego image thanks to the re-embedding approach.
7.3.1 A possible measure of the difficulty
Defining the inner difficulty of an image is problematic: the inner difficulty
should be an universal value in the sense that it should not depend on
the model used or the set of features. In the best scenario, one wants a
number explaining the inner difficulty for any steganalysis setup. This value
should summarize how often the image considered is misclassified for the
qualitative steganalysis problem for example, or be related to the error
(Mean Square Error, for example) that steganalysis systems make in the
framework of quantitative steganalysis. Hence, this number (or possibly a
set of numbers, for both quantitative and qualitative steganalysis) reflects
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how “dangerous” an image potentially is, for the false positive or false
negative rates (respectively the mean square error on the embedding rate)
tend to deviate from the average behavior of the steganalysis system. In this
prospect, it is sensible to use a measure based on the standard deviation of
the error performed for that image, compared to the average situation for
other images.We define a measure
of the image difficulty,
given the genuine
image.
In this analysis, we use the 193 DCT calibrated feature set and propose
to estimate this inner difficulty D by the variation of the predictions for a
given original embedding rate Eo when the embedding stego-key, or the
embedded message varies.
To measure it, we propose to use the real original image (before a message
was embedded in it) i, which is obviously not available in a real case. This
“theoretical” analysis is merely to demonstrate that the estimated confidence
interval on Ro can be used as a measure of the inner difficulty.
We propose to make L embeddings to L copies of i, with varying number
of embedding changes EOj , leading to an embedding rate R
O
j , 1 ￿ j ￿ L (in
publication F, L = 100). The model M is used to obtain an estimate RˆOj of the
embedding rate ROj .The measureD uses
the steganalysis error
for first embeddings
with different
stego-keys/ payloads.
The inner difficulty D for image i can then be estimated over the set of L
realizations by
D(i) = std
￿
RˆOj − R
O
j
￿
. (7.4)
This measure is used in the following to illustrate the relevance of the
width of the confidence interval on the estimated value of Ro as an estimator
of the inner image difficulty. We do not claim that this measure is absolute
and universal for the inner difficulty of an image, but only that the value D(i)
should react positively when the image is difficult for the stego algorithm
and feature set used.
Later work focused on the estimation of this inner image difficulty should
compare the behavior of this proposed measure when the feature set, the
stego algorithm and the embedding rates range, vary. Most likely, some more
elaborate measure could generalize this early concept to a wider range of
stego algorithms and steganalysis systems.
Before we present some of the results from publication F, let us first review
a specific test which could be called “conality test”.
7.3.2 A “conality” test
The results concerning the estimation of the inner difficulty D of an image
revealed a “cone-shaped” distribution (see results section 3 of publication F),
with a non-uniform repartition of the samples.This test permits to
check that the data
follows a “cone”
distribution.
We want to quantify how this distribution of points grows on average, and
also how the variance of the distribution grows: for a data set which lies
inside a cone, as on Figure 21, the ordinate y of the points grows on average
with the abscissa x, and so does the variance. This toy example is to illustrate
how this test is based on locality functions.
In order to measure and plot the evolution of this variance and mean of
the distribution, we use a k-NN approach:
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Figure 21: Plot of the original toy data with a distribution shaped as a cone.
1. For each point in the distribution, find the k nearest neighbors (pairwise
distance is measured only using the abscissa x of the points);
2. Compute for each point the mean and variance over the k nearest
neighbors (mean and variance computed using the ordinate y).
The result for the toy data of Figure 21 is depicted on Figure 22. The red
central points are the means over the 30 nearest neighbors for each point, and
the black surrounding points are the means plus/ minus twice the standard
deviation (again, computed over the 30 nearest neighbors). The distribution of
points grows in mean
and variance, as for a
“flat cone”.
It can be seen that the mean is constantly growing with the abscissa, and
that the width of the cone (the “variance for each point”) is also increasing.
This characterizes the “conality” of the data: the ordinate value y increases
on average and the spreading of the points grows with it.
7.3.3 Inner image difficulty estimation
Using the width of the confidence interval obtained on Rˆo, we first check
against the difficulty D value. Figure 23 (from publication F) represents all
the 700 images used, each with N = 1500 repetitions. We estimate the inner
image difficultyD by
the width of the
confidence interval.
Although the distribution of the points in the plot is less obvious than for
the toy example previously mentioned, the “cone” shape is still present. We
propose to highlight this shape by using the conality test presented, and find
that the “mean for each point” — for its 30 nearest neighbors — grows in a
linear fashion (see F for the plots). The variance behaves similarly.
Overall this correlation between the width of the confidence interval for
the estimated Rˆo and the proposed inner image difficulty measure D proves
that the re-embedding approach for this estimation is justified.
As stated in F, it is noteworthy that the variance also increases with respect
to the width of the confidence interval. This basically means that the larger
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
50
100
150
200
250
Figure 22: Results of the “conality” test: central red dots depict the growing mean
over the 30 nearest neighbors and surrounding black dots the mean ±2
times the standard deviation (also over the 30 nearest neighbors).
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Figure 23: D (measure of inner image difficulty) versus width of confidence interval
for Rˆo. The distribution of points is not uniform and shaped like a cone.
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is the obtained confidence interval, the harder it is to obtain an accurate
estimation of the difficulty.
7.4 conclusion
We have reviewed a methodology using the concept of re-embedding for
quantitative steganalysis. Using this concept, we derive a simple estimation
of the original embedding rate used by the sender, Ro along with a confidence
interval on it. We further verify that the width of this confidence interval
can be used to measure the inner image difficulty, by comparing to quantity
measured with the use of the original genuine image.
While the results from publication F are rather new and novel, they pos-
sibly need deeper research and tests on a larger range of images and stego
algorithms, since the concept is only tested on one stego method here, nsF5.
We would like to point out on a problem which is eluded in publication F —
since it does not belong to the presented concept — the amount of data to
process. Originally, the experiments were carried out on about 2000 images
from the BOWS2 set [10], and not 700. Handling of the 1500 repetitions
over 2000 images became a problem, in terms of memory and calculations,
and we reverted to 700 images for the moment. Fortunately, the use of the
OP-ELM made the computations tractable even on such large data set. In the
future, we would like to validate these results on a larger set of images —
for example to obtain a more uniform distribution of points on Figure 23 —
and test the methodology for other stego algorithms to verify if the behavior
is similar or if the difficulty of the steganalysis task (using this same set of
features) influences the results on the confidence interval and inner image
difficulty estimation.

8SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS
In this dissertation, we have addressed two different sides of the global
steganalysis problem: the classical steganalysis one (using classification) and
the quantitative steganalysis one (regression).
For the classical “qualitative” steganalysis, we have proposed a two-step
methodology which originates from publications C and D. The first step of
this methodology attempts at estimating the relevance of the results — in a
statistical significance way — and helps devising a sufficient number of sam-
ples required for the experiments. By measuring the variance of the results
over multiple bootstrap iterations, for different amounts of samples, it is pos-
sible to find a threshold above which the results of a specific model become
statistically significant (i.e. the variance of the results is small enough).
The second step aims at performing feature selection on the set of features
used for the steganalysis task. Since these sets tend to be large (in the
magnitude of hundreds of features), the associated data is becoming more
challenging to process and interpret. By reducing the dimensionality using
Forward feature selection, the computational time required for the model
to be trained is notably decreased (several orders of magnitude): for some
of the tested stego algorithms, a reduction of the feature set by a factor of
approximately 10 yields similar results for all the tested embedding rates
(in the example of Outguess). In the last part of this step, the selection of
features allows for interpretation and the analysis of the ranking of features
by the Forward gives information on what reacts the most vividly to the
embedding of a message. This can give precious information on the potential
weaknesses of the stego algorithm studied, and eventually reveal parts of its
functioning.
In order to conduct this methodology on a larger scale than in publications
C and D, a fast and efficient machine learning model, which could be kept
throughout the whole methodology, was needed. Indeed, in order to reduce
the variations in the methodology, it is better to use the same model for
determining the sufficient number of samples and then select the features.
The OP-ELM (publication A) is proposed in this spirit and uses the original
ELM [69] to which is added a neuron pruning strategy. A Single Layer Feed
forward Neural Network is built using random projections in the first layer
(weights randomly initialized), following the ELM original structure. A large
number of neurons is used in the first place and the irrelevant ones are
finally pruned using a neuron-ranking algorithm, the MRSR [117], with a
Leave-One-Out decision criterion.
This model achieves state of the art performances, while having computa-
tional times reduced by orders of magnitude (compared, for example, with a
SVM). We claim that it is among the best performance/ speed ratio.
In publication B, the Leave-One-Out decision criterion of the OP-ELM is
proposed to be replaced by an information criterion, the Hannan-Quinn one.
This has the effect of reducing by three to four folds (for the datasets tested)
the computational time of the OP-ELM, while retaining similar performances.
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The OP-ELM is used in the methodology presented in publication E, which
enables to perform the estimation of a sufficient number of samples and of
a reduced feature set for a large database of images (the BOWS2 challenge
base [10]) and for six popular stego algorithms.
Quantitative steganalysis is then addressed, with the aim of estimating a
confidence interval for the estimation of the original embedding rate (related
to the message size embedded by the sender). A novel approach is used in
this sense: Re-embedding. The idea is to embed a new message of known size
in the suspicious image (which might already contain one). By performing
this operation many times (on different copies of the suspicious image each
time) for varying sizes of the newly embedded message, we propose to
estimate the original embedding rate used by the sender. This is done by a
simple linear regression. A confidence interval is also devised by this method,
for the estimated original embedding rate.
This approach gives better results (for the one stego algorithm tested) than
a “standard” quantitative steganalysis using directly the feature set on the
suspicious image.
In addition, we propose to estimate the inner image difficulty (in the sense
that it is behaving in an “unusual way” for steganalysis tasks), with the
width of the estimated confidence interval. By measuring the inner difficulty
of the image using the genuine version of it, we show that the width of the
confidence interval is correlated with it.
In conclusion, the machine learning setup in the steganalysis framework
is not a usual one for two main reasons. First, new data to train and test
the model used is easy and rather costless to acquire: taking new pictures
of outdoor or family scenes and using them with stego algorithms does
not yield heavy processing costs as for other domains where acquiring a
new sample uses complicated equipment and costs large amounts of money.
Second, a goal in steganalysis (and steganography) is to have as good as
possible a model of the image considered; we have seen that this can be
approximated by the use of features, which are nowadays numerous, to
always model better the image and its characteristics. The machine learning
problem becomes high-dimensional, and the data grows exponentially larger
with the new features devised, leading to a problems harder to solve, in terms
of machine learning models. There is hence a need in steganalysis, for fast
and efficient machine learning models, and as importantly methodologies to
obtain reliable and relevant results.
If the work achieved was to be pursued, there are several directions to
explore, to possibly improve the results and performances but also to widen
the view and approach.
First of, the work on the quantitative steganalysis and inner image difficulty
estimation is recent and it could be extended in the future to more stego
algorithms and a larger database of images, to proof this approach on other
similar problems.
Second, the OP-ELM might be improved, in terms of “stability” — since
the OP-ELM uses random projections and is not deterministic. Indeed, the
only hyper-parameter of the OP-ELM, the number of neurons, can be crucial
for some problems, and its determination is mostly heuristic. Hence, an
inappropriate choice made by the user on this hyper-parameter can lead
to unstable results — which are spotted quickly in validation. The idea of
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the OP-ELM (pruning irrelevant neurons) and of the EM-ELM (adding new
neurons to an existing structure) could be combined, in a possibly slightly
slower method, but providing more stability in terms of the results obtained.
Third, the mentioned reverse-engineering infered from the selected features
in the classical steganalysis methodology should be put to use. By identifying
the most sensitive features for a specific scheme, it must be possible to
improve its original scheme and perform a better steganography. Although
we mention which features are selected for which stego algorithm, this
study has never gone any further. The author believes that even if such
improvements will not render a very insecure stego system suddenly secure,
it should improve it nonetheless; which might in turn raise a new interest
for it in the steganalysis community.
Finally, as Andrew Ker stated it in a talk given at Telecom ParisTech school,
the field of steganography has still some important, although barely explored,
areas such as the Batch Steganography and Pooled Steganalysis problem
[76]. The matter of hiding a message in multiple images is very different
from hiding into just one — the approach is probably more statistical and
less “hands-on” than with typical JPEG stego algorithms — and has not yet
received an important attention from the researchers of the community. This
is rather surprising though, since the most realistic case of a “smart and evil”
steganographer would very likely involve the use of multiple images. . .
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